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1. Introduction 
As the globalization trend has drastically expanded during the last decades so 
has the amount of migration and refugees all over the world. Wars, conflicts and 
natural disasters inevitably lead to masses of people trying to find shelter in 
another State than their country of origin. This in turn has led to a growing need 
for comprehensive and adequate international law regarding refugee rights and 
the obligations of States towards them. The content of this international refugee 
law can dramatically influence a refugee's life, health or security, which means 
that the obligations that are directed towards States should not be taken lightly. 
While there has been substantial development regarding this field of law in the 
United Nations and other international organizations since at least the early 
1930s1, questions of refugee law are often highly political and bring forth 
heated debate that has continued to this day. If there is not sufficient consensus 
among States regarding the legal rules of refugee law and their application, the 
whole field of law may appear too unclear and ambiguous. Thus it can be 
argued that a legal analysis of these rules is of utmost importance, especially 
when taking into account the aforementioned possible dramatic effects on 
individuals resulting from refugee policies. 
 
One of the most important rules regarding refugee law is the prohibition on 
refoulement2. The principle of non-refoulement has many varying definitions 
but one could say that it basically prohibits a State from ejecting a refugee from 
its territory and returning that refugee to a place where he or she might be 
exposed to torture or experience persecution3. Non-refoulement can also protect 
a refugee from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. However 
international law at the same time provides that States in normal circumstances 
have the right to decide whether they allow entry to aliens or whether they 
                                                 
1   See for instance the 1933 Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees, (1935) 
159   LNTS 3663, Article 3. 
2   The name of the principle comes from the French term “refouler”, which can be roughly 
translated as “return” or “reject”. 
3   Duffy 2008, p. 373. 
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deport an alien. The principle of non-refoulement can be seen as restricting the 
aforementioned right of States, and it is connected to the absolute prohibition of 
torture and to fundamental human rights. States however have an interest to 
defend their right to deport or reject refugees especially on the basis that not 
expelling a refugee is a threat to their security. States have also tried to prevent 
situations where they would be bound by rules of refugee law by implementing 
practices of non-entrée4. This presents questions on how far can States go in 
their policies before they are deemed as acting against the object and purpose of 
the principle that binds them. Thus we can see an important characteristic of 
refugee law: it prohibits States from acting in a way that would violate the 
rights of refugees and obliges them to guarantee those rights. Connected to this 
is the question whether the rules are absolute or, in other words, whether they 
can be derogated from? 
 
The prohibition on refoulement is codified in many international human rights 
treaties. I will introduce here the four most important treaties that contain this 
principle either explicitly or implicitly. Firstly, there is the United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (later referred to as the Refugee 
Convention). Secondly there is the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (later referred to as ECHR). Thirdly 
there is the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (later referred to as CAT). And 
fourthly there is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (later 
referred to as ICCPR). These conventions differ from one another in how they 
supervise and enforce the principle of non-refoulement as well as in how they 
define the exact content and scope of that principle. Naturally the applicability 
of these conventions depends on whether a State has signed and ratified one. 
However, all of these treaties have been ratified in a rather widespread manner 
by numerous States either regionally or globally, depending on the type of the 
                                                 
4   Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014, p. 244. 
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convention. What is common to them all is that they are human rights treaties 
and have been established in the latter half of the 20th century. 
 
This thesis focuses on the assessment of the principle of non-refoulement in 
light of the most important human rights treaties that govern it. I have chosen to 
include the Refugee Convention, ECHR and CAT in the assessment. ICCPR 
will not be analyzed because it would extend the length of this thesis too much 
without providing sufficient unique content regarding the principle of non-
refoulement. In my opinion its content resembles too strongly that of ECHR 
and CAT, while its supervisory mechanism does not contain as rich or 
consistent case law as those two5. It is important to gain an understanding about 
how the prohibition on refoulement is codified, interpreted and enforced in each 
of the systems and mechanisms of these conventions. Crucial to achieving this 
is going through the case law that has developed under the European Court of 
Human Rights (later referred to as ECtHR, a judicial body under ECHR) and 
the Committee against Torture (later referred to as ComAT, a judicial body 
under CAT).  Under the Refugee Convention significant interpretative material 
has been created by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (later 
referred to as UNHCR) and the bodies connected to it or contained in it such as 
the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme (later 
referred to as EXCOM). The analysis of this material is also essential for 
understanding the principle of non-refoulement. Naturally of importance to the 
interpretation of the treaties can also be the preparatory work regarding them as 
well as scholarly writings on them. 
 
A research question which this thesis aims to answer is what content does the 
principle of non-refoulement have in international law under the 
aforementioned three treaty regimes? Connected to this is the question what 
                                                 
5    Jari Pirjola chose to exclude ICCPR in his article as well, arguing that it has been precisely 
ECHR and CAT that have proven out to provide protection for those asylum-seekers that are 
not protected by the Refugee Convention. See Pirjola 2002, p. 743. 
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differences and similarities do the regimes have when compared against each 
other in this context? And finally, what kind of gaps are there in refugee 
protection regarding a treaty regime and are those gaps filled with the 
protection granted by another treaty regime? 
 
I will begin with the assessment of the content of the prohibition on 
refoulement in three human rights treaties separately. The Refugee Convention 
will be discussed first, which will be followed by ECHR. After that I will 
analyze the content of the principle of non-refoulement in the context of CAT. 
This will be followed by a comparative study of the three convention regimes, 
where major differences and similarities between them will be discussed. 
Finally, I will present concluding remarks regarding the aforementioned 
research questions. 
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2. The principle of non-refoulement in three human rights 
treaty regimes 
2.1 Brief remarks regarding the interpretation of human 
rights treaties 
As this chapter focuses on three human rights treaties it is useful to discuss first 
shortly the general rules regarding the interpretation of treaties. The general rule 
of treaty interpretation can be found in article 31 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (later referred to as VCLT). VCLT article 31(1) States that 
“a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose”. Also meaningful are any agreements or instruments 
connected to concluding the treaty, subsequent agreements or practices by the 
parties and relevant rules of international law. An example of a subsequent 
agreement that influences the interpretation of a treaty is the United Nations 
General Assembly’s resolution in which it declared that terrorism is contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations6. As will be discussed later in 
chapter 2.2, according to article 1(F) (c) of the Refugee Convention a person 
will not be entitled to refugee status if he is “guilty of acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of United Nations”. Thus the aforementioned 
subsequent agreement is relevant for the interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention7. According to VCLT article 32 preparatory work of the treaty and 
the circumstances of concluding it can affect treaty interpretation only when it 
is necessary “to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 
31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31 
a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or b) leads to a result which is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable”. 
 
As “law-making treaties” human rights treaties protect human beings, and, 
unlike many other treaties, States parties do not have their own subjective 
                                                 
6   UN GA A/RES/51/210, 1997. 
7   Aust 2007, p. 240. 
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interests in mind when concluding such treaties8. The special character of 
human rights treaties means that their object and purpose, in other words 
humanitarian goals, have particular relevance to the interpretation9. Arguably 
the object and purpose can in some cases be more valuable than the text of the 
treaty itself, although in the law of treaties precedence seems to be given to the 
textual interpretation10. Human rights treaties need to be interpreted in a 
dynamic and evolutive way (this will be especially discussed in chapter 2.3), 
and all rights contained in them should be interpreted liberally and restrictions 
on those rights narrowly11. The evolutive interpretation can be seen as 
highlighting the relative insignificancy of the preparatory work of treaties: 
human rights treaties must not fall behind in addressing modern issues even if 
those issues were not thought of at the time of their creation. These are the most 
important rules of interpretation that we should keep in mind when discussing 
human rights treaties. Nonetheless general rules of treaty interpretation can also 
prove useful for the interpretation of these treaties of a special nature. 
  
2.2 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees 
2.2.1 General introduction to the United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees 
After the Second World War the codification process of refugee law developed 
relatively fast. As early as 1950 a decision by United Nations General Assembly 
was made that a conference of plenipotentiaries would convene to complete and 
sign the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees12. This conference turned 
out to be successful as the Refugee Convention entered into force on 22nd of 
April 1954. Later on in 1967 a protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 
followed (later referred to as the 1967 Protocol). The main aim of this protocol 
                                                 
8   Wouters 2009, p. 6. Orakhelashvili 2003, p. 532. 
9     Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003, p. 104. 
10    Aust 2007, p. 235. 
11   Wouters 2009, p. 12. 
12   UN GA res. 429(V), 1950. 
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was to remove the temporal and optional geographical limitations contained in 
Refugee Convention. It is neither necessary nor possible to evaluate the 1967 
Protocol separately in this thesis, especially when as of April 2015 there are 142 
States that are parties to both the Refugee Convention and to the 1967 
Protocol13. Thus when discussing the Refugee Convention in this thesis I 
include the 1967 Protocol in its content. It can be argued that the Refugee 
Convention is the most influential treaty in refugee law, especially when such a 
large amount of States has ratified it. 
 
Already from the preamble of the Refugee Convention it becomes clear that it 
is a human rights treaty which aims to protect fundamental rights without 
discrimination. The preamble refers explicitly to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948, later referred to as UNDHR) as affirmation. It also 
emphasizes the humanitarian and social nature of the problem of refugees. 
More precisely it represents a remedial branch of human rights law because its 
purpose is to ensure adequate protection in asylum States of the rights of those 
who are not protected in their countries of origins (refugees)14. This kind of 
international refugee protection establishes rights to the refugees such as the 
right to be protected from refoulement. It also defines “a refugee” and sets 
standards for their treatment.15  
 
The Refugee Convention consists of 7 chapters and 46 articles. These chapters 
are titled “General Provisions”, “Juridical Status”, “Gainful Employment”, 
“Welfare”, “Administrative Measures”, “Executory and Transitory Provisions” 
and finally “Final Clauses”. The definition of a refugee is found in Article 1, 
and the rights of refugees are listed in articles 3 to 34. It is important to note 
that even though the principle of non-refoulement is codified in article 33 of the 
                                                 
13  High Commissioner for Refugees: States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, 2015. 
14  Hathaway 2005, p. 5. 
15  Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, p. 53. 
  
8 
 
Refugee Convention, Article 1 is still necessary for understanding it16. Although 
article 42 (1) allows States to make reservations to some of the articles of the 
Refugee Convention, it explicitly prohibits this in regard to article 33. Thus all 
States parties to the Refugee Convention are bound by the prohibition of 
refoulement. 
 
Although the textual content of a treaty is naturally the starting point for 
understanding it, it is necessary to mention here the most important sources that 
can significantly influence the interpretation of the Refugee Convention. Article 
38 of the Refugee Convention States that “Any dispute between parties to this 
Convention relating to its interpretation or application, which cannot be settled 
by other means, shall be referred to the International Court of Justice at the 
request of any one of the parties to the dispute”. Unfortunately to date that 
article has not been invoked and thus no binding international interpretations 
exist regarding the Refugee Convention. This means that it is interpreted 
regularly by domestic decision-makers instead of an inter-State supervisory 
body, which has been viewed as exceptional in the field of international human 
rights law17. This thesis concentrates on the international interpretation of the 
prohibition on refoulement and hence it is not necessary to evaluate the 
domestic interpretations in depth. Luckily there exists material that is, if not 
binding, still valuable in interpreting the Refugee Convention. I refer mainly to 
the UNHCR and EXCOM, which have been viewed as authoritative, global in 
their scope and accepted as important sources by States parties18. UNHCR is 
mentioned in article 35(1) of the Refugee Convention which states that “The 
Contracting States undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United 
Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in 
particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of 
                                                 
16  Wouters 2009, p. 36. 
17  Hathaway, North and Pobjoy 2013, p. 323. Pirjola 2002, p. 756. 
18  Wouters 2009, p. 38. 
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this Convention”. The purpose of article 35 can be seen as achieving an optimal 
and harmonized interpretation of all the provisions of the Refugee 
Convention19. EXCOM was established in 1958 by the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (later referred to as ECOSOC) and has the 
competence to advise the UNHCR on solving issues of refugee law20.  Today 
EXCOM consists of 98 member States21. Most relevant legal instruments are 
the “Guidelines” issued by UNCHR and the “Conclusions on International 
Protection” by EXCOM. 
 
 
2.2.2 The principle of non-refoulement in the United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
2.2.2.1 An overview of article 33 and article 1 
The principle of non-refoulement is articulated in article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention, which States in its first paragraph that “No Contracting State shall 
expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account 
of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion”. However, this rule is not absolute as becomes clear from the 
second paragraph: “The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be 
claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a 
danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been 
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a 
danger to the community of that country”. It is interesting to note that in the 
beginning the principle was drafted so that it did not contain the exceptions 
clause, because the Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons felt 
that the principle was so fundamental in nature22. It appears that the “climate of 
                                                 
19   Kälin 2001, p. 3. 
20   UN ECOSOC res. 672 (XXV), 1958. UN GA res. 1166 (XII), 1957. 
21   EXCOM membership by admission of members, 2015. 
22   UN doc. E/1850 1950, paragraph 30. 
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opinion” had altered in 1951 in such a way that the exceptions clause was 
ultimately deemed necessary23. It is important to note that even though the 
prohibition on refoulement is not absolute it can still be considered fundamental 
to the humanitarian aim of the Refugee Convention and thus any exception on it 
should be interpreted narrowly. 
 
Since the prohibition on refoulement concerns only refugees, the definition of a 
refugee is also relevant for the interpretation of article 33. According to article 
1(A) (2) of the Refugee Convention a refugee is “any person who owing to 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”. It is 
important to note here that protection from refoulement is not dependent on the 
formal recognition of a refugee, but instead asylum-seekers are treated on the 
assumption that they may be refugees and thus must be effectively protected24.  
The wording of article 1(A) (2) is similar to the wording on article 33(1), the 
main difference being that the latter speaks of a “threat to life or freedom” and 
the former of a “well-founded fear of persecution”. At first glance and from a 
purely textual perspective it might seem that article 33(1) would require a 
higher threshold than article 1(A) (2). It appears however that a vast majority of 
academics have argued for an interpretation where a “well-founded fear of 
persecution” must be considered as fulfilling a “threat to life or freedom”, 
because another interpretation would be against the object and purpose of the 
                                                 
23   UN doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16 1951, third Statement by the representative of the United 
Kingdom (Mr.   Hoare). 
24   For instance, UN doc. A/AC.96/815 1993, paragraph 11. Thus the personal scope of the 
prohibition on refoulement is not limited to persons who have been formally recognized as 
refugees. 
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Refugee Convention as well as internally incoherent25. Support for this liberal 
interpretation can also be found on the preparatory work of the Refugee 
Convention, where a “threat to freedom” was seen as a “relative term” which 
did not necessarily require a severe risk to the refugee26. The difference 
between the wordings of the articles have been explained as emphasizing that 
the application of the principle of non-refoulement is not limited to the country 
of origin but instead extends anywhere where there is a reason to fear 
persecution27. Thus I have seen it justified to use the phrase “well-founded fear 
of persecution” when discussing article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention in this 
thesis. Indeed, when discussing the prohibition on refoulement in the context of 
the Refugee Convention, article 33 must be read in conjunction with article 1 
(A) (2). 
 
Article 33 can be seen as consisting of many elements and in the following sub-
chapters I will therefore go through one element of the article at a time. The 
issue of what amounts to expelling or returning (“refouler”) and the territorial 
scope of article 33 will be first discussed shortly. After that the harm from 
which a person is protected and the element of risk will be analyzed. Lastly I 
will go through the exceptions enumerated in article 33 (2). Article 1 includes 
exclusion clauses regarding the status of a refugee, and even though there exists 
the aforementioned intimate connection between article 1 and article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention, those exclusion clauses will not be examined when 
discussing the exceptions to the protection from refoulement. In my opinion 
that would needlessly broaden the scope of this thesis and since the application 
of those exclusion clauses in article 1 result in a different outcome than the 
application of the exception clauses in article 33 (2), it is clearer to stay focused 
purely on the latter. 
                                                 
25   See for instance Stenberg 1989, p. 219; Grahl-Madsen 1997, p. 138; Lauterpacht and 
Bethlehem 2003, p. 123 – 124; Hathaway 2005, p. 304 – 305; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 
2007, p. 234; Wouters 2009, p. 57. 
26   UN doc. E/AC.32/SR.20 1950, paragraph 65. 
27   UN doc. EC/SCP/2 1977, paragraph 4. 
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2.2.2.2 Prohibited measures and the (extra-) territorial scope 
States are prohibited from expelling or returning a refugee according to article 
33 (1) of the Refugee Convention. A literal meaning of the word “expel” is 
“force someone to leave a place”28. In the context of article 33 (1) of the 
Refugee Convention the term “expel” has been defined as the only measure 
available for removing lawfully staying aliens from the territory of a State that 
has issued a formal expulsion order29. Thus for a State to be able to expel a 
refugee, that refugee must be in the territory of the expelling State. While the 
term “expel” might seem unambiguous enough, the word “return” does not 
suffice in its own. A literal meaning for “return” is “send something back to a 
place”30. The emphasis of the term “return” seems to be in the destination of the 
refugee, and the drafters of the Refugee Convention remarked that the aim must 
be to not let refugees “be pushed back into the arms of their persecutors”31. In 
the context of the Refugee Convention the French word “refouler” was 
explicitly inserted into the authentic English text so that the term “return” is 
always followed by “refouler”, clarifying its meaning32. “Refoulement” has 
been seen as encompassing both situations inside the territory of a State and 
situations that are outside it such as non-admittance33. Therefore, the 
prohibition on refoulement applies not only in the territories of the “refouling” 
State but also extra-territorially.  
 
Although the prohibition on refoulement applies extra-territorially, its scope is 
not unlimited. Firstly, its application is limited to areas outside the refugee’s 
country of nationality. Territorial jurisdiction of the country of nationality 
prevents international protection without exception.34 Thus foreign embassies 
                                                 
28   <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/expel>. Accessed on 30.3.2016. 
29   Grahl-Madsen 1997, p. 136. 
30   <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/return>. Accessed on 30.3.2016. 
31   UN doc. E/AC.32/SR.21 1950, paragraph 26. 
32   UN doc. A/CONF.2.SR.35 1951, article 33 (second Statement by the President). 
33   Grahl-Madsen 1997, p. 136. 
34   UNCHR Handbook 2011, paragraph 88. This territorial limitation is mentioned explicitly in 
the article 1 (A) (2) of the Refugee Convention. 
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or diplomatic missions cannot grant protection from refoulement35. Secondly it 
would seem reasonable that what is required is some kind of a consequential 
relationship between the State conduct and the risk of persecution on the 
refugee. The conduct must be attributed to a State either because the State has 
actual control or authority over the refugee regardless of the location or because 
it exercises effective control over a foreign territory in which the conduct 
occurs.36 
 
Here we can see the first gap in refugee protection regarding this treaty regime: 
if a refugee is inside his country of nationality the Refugee Convention cannot 
offer that refugee protection from refoulement. Therefore, those unfortunate 
individuals who are not successful in leaving their country or who are unwilling 
to even attempt it can be seen as stuck without protection before they fulfill this 
criterion. Although it is in general logical to apply refugee law only in 
situations where a person is outside his country of nationality, this gap of 
protection can lead to difficult situations in some cases. 
 
2.2.2.3 The harm from which a person is protected 
As we established earlier (in chapter 2.2.2.1), in the context of the Refugee 
Convention the relevant term for the harm from which a person is protected is 
“persecution”. For a person to receive refugee protection, he must have a well-
founded fear of persecution, and that persecution must be connected to a 
discriminatory reason enumerated in article 33(1): race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion. I will firstly 
analyze the meaning and definition of the term “persecution”, focusing on what 
kind of actions or violations it entails without explicitly discussing the 
discriminatory reasons. After that the five different discriminatory reasons will 
be scrutinized, and finally some concluding remarks will be drawn regarding 
                                                 
35   Wouters 2009, p. 49. 
36   Ibid. p. 53. 
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the harm from which a person is protected by the prohibition on non-
refoulement in the Refugee Convention.  
  
Persecution is not defined in the Refugee Convention and it can be seen as a 
flexible concept.  What kind of measures can then amount to persecution? A 
threat to life or freedom as well as other serious human right violations are 
always persecution37. It seems that a sufficient level of severity is required, and 
important factors to consider are the type, nature and scale of a human rights 
violation38. Measures that would not alone amount to persecution can together 
produce it on cumulative grounds39. It has also been argued that persecution 
signifies a sustained or systematic failure by a State in regard to protecting 
recognized international human rights and this failure results in serious harm to 
a person40. In my opinion this definition is useful because of its broadness, for 
instance a State failure can be caused either by its activity or inactivity, the 
focus being on the results. Thus it is clear that for one to evaluate whether 
something amounts to persecution or not, one should take a human rights 
approach. In my opinion it would seem artificial to attempt to limit persecution 
to only certain kinds of human rights violations, for instance by excluding 
socio-economic rights41. What should matter is that as a result of a human rights 
violation the victim suffers serious discriminatory harm regardless of how, why 
and by who the violation was instigated. 
 
The persecution must occur for a specific, discriminatory reason. It appears that 
                                                 
37   UNHCR Handbook 2011, paragraph 51. 
38   Wouters 2009, p. 58. 
39   UNHCR Handbook 2011, paragraph 53. 
40   Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 185. Hathaway and Foster come to this conclusion by 
analyzing a variety of case law that contains evaluation of persecution, for instance the case 
Islam (A.P.) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v. Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal and Another, Ex Parte Shah (A.P.), United Kingdom: House of Lords (Judicial 
Committee), 1999. 
41   Quite to the contrary it has been argued that since major human rights documents such as 
the UNDHR contain socio-economic rights, violations of those rights may amount to 
persecution. See Foster 2007, p. 28. In my opinion it is also noteworthy that the Refugee 
Convention refers explicitly to the UNDHR.  
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a discriminatory reason does not need to be the sole reason for the 
persecution42. Instead it must be a relevant factor that contributes to the well-
founded fear of persecution43. Race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group and political opinion can be seen as such precious 
characteristics to groups or individuals as to warrant special protection44. Race, 
religion and nationality have to be interpreted broadly and thus they include all 
kinds of ethnic and linguistic groups (instead of mere citizenship) as well as the 
right to freedom of thought and conscience45. Membership of a particular social 
group can grant protection in two cases: if a group shares an immutable 
characteristic or a characteristic that is fundamental to human dignity; or if a 
group shares a characteristic that is cognizable to those outside of it or sets the 
group apart from society in large. The former case includes characteristics such 
as homosexuality or gender, while the latter can recognize for instance 
occupation or social class. It is important to note that the shared characteristic 
cannot solely exist on the basis of the persecution aimed at certain individuals.46 
Political opinion have to be also interpreted broadly including any opinions that 
are related to a State, its government or its policies47. It is important to stress the 
requirement that a sufficient connection must exist between the political 
opinions expressed and the fear of persecution – opposing a government will 
not suffice on its own. However, protection can be afforded in exceptional cases 
even to those who have not yet expressed their political opinion when their 
conviction is so strong that a future conflict with the government can be 
assumed.48 
 
To summarize, the principle of non-refoulement in the context of the Refugee 
                                                 
42   Foster 2007, p. 247. Foster bases his argument largely on the case law of some common law 
countries such as Canada. See also the wording of the article 1 (A) (2) of the Refugee 
Convention and UNCHR Handbook 2011, paragraph 81. 
43   Wouters 2009, p. 76. 
44   Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, p. 92. 
45   UNHCR Handbook 2011, paragraphs 68 – 76.  
46   UNCHR Guidelines 2002, paragraphs 2 and 5 – 9. 
47   Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, p. 87. 
48   UNCHR Handbook 2011, paragraph 80 – 82. 
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Convention protects a person when that person has a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted. Persecution can be seen as a human rights violation which is 
attributed to the State’s activity or inactivity and results in serious harm to the 
protected individual. Additionally, persecution must be connected to a 
discriminatory reason: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion. A discriminatory reason doesn’t need to be the 
sole reason for persecution but should be a relevant contributing factor amongst 
others. The discriminatory reasons are interpreted broadly. Finally, it should be 
noted that it has been proposed that torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment should be included in the definition of persecution 
regardless of whether these acts fulfill the discrimination requirement49. I do 
not, however, agree with this proposition mostly because the requirement of 
discrimination remains valid regarding the refugee determination which is 
considered very closely linked with the content of the principle of non-
refoulement50. 
 
It has become clear that the second gap in refugee protection regarding this 
treaty regime is a situation where the persecution is not linked to any 
discriminatory reason. In this situation, the refugee may have a well-founded 
fear of harm that would otherwise be classified as persecution but the lack of 
discriminatory features cancels that classification. For instance, being subjected 
to the death row phenomenon in USA has been classified as inhuman treatment 
by the European Court of Human Rights but on its own lacks discriminatory 
features and thus would not constitute persecution in the context of the Refugee 
Convention. This presents serious issues for the refugees and can lead one to 
question the necessity of the discrimination requirement. 
 
                                                 
49   Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003, p. 123 – 127. 
50   For instance, UNHCR Handbook 2011, paragraph 66 states clearly that for a person to be 
considered a refugee he must be persecuted for a discriminatory reason. 
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2.2.2.4 The element of risk 
It is important to note that the protection against refoulement in article 33 (1) of 
the Refugee Convention does not require a full certainty of persecution but 
instead a sufficient level of threat. In other words it includes an element of risk, 
which can be seen as a crucial element for determining whether a person has a 
right to be protected from refoulement51. As I pointed out earlier in chapter 
2.2.2.1, the prohibition on refoulement in the context of the Refugee 
Convention must be interpreted by reading article 33 in conjunction with article 
1 (A) (2). The former speaks of a threat to life or freedom and the latter both 
clarifies the reason for protection to a well-founded fear of persecution as well 
as limits protection to situations where it is unavailable in the country of 
nationality. This leads to the conclusion that the element of risk requires that a 
person must have a well-founded fear of persecution and he or she must be 
unable or unwilling to obtain protection from his country of origin52. How this 
risk and the availability of national protection is evaluated will next be 
examined more closely. 
 
A person is not protected solely on the basis that he has a subjective fear of 
persecution because that fear needs to be supported by an objective situation. 
What is needed is a fear that is well-founded, and it has been stated that both a 
subjective and an objective element must be considered.53 However, there 
seems to exist some controversy regarding the importance of the subjective 
element. While the UNHCR explicitly speaks of “the evaluation of the 
subjective element54” academics have instead argued that the personal mind-set 
“hardly matters at all55” or that “it is a notion that should simply be 
                                                 
51   Wouters states that it is unfortunate to not have any clear international legal interpretation of 
the risk criterion, because it is “essential” in non-refoulement cases. See Wouters 2009, p. 
84. 
52   Wouters 2009, p. 83. 
53   UNHCR Handbook 2011, paragraph 38. However, it is acknowledged that in some cases 
such as when the refugee is a mentally disturbed person, the burden of proof is lightened. 
See ibid. paragraph 210. 
54   Ibid. paragraph 40. 
55   Grahl-Madsen 1966, p. 174. 
  
18 
 
abandoned56” and that to interpret the term “well-founded fear” as including a 
subjective element “cannot be the correct interpretation of the refugee 
definition57”. It has been stated that the term “fear” in article 1 (A) (2) of the 
Refugee Convention should be read as “the likelihood of something unwelcome 
happening” instead of an emotional state of mind, which is indicated also by the 
use of the term “threat” in article 3358. It has also been argued that neither the 
text of the Refugee Convention nor its object and purpose point towards the 
relevance of a subjective fear59. Indeed, the views of the scholars seem more 
persuasive in this matter than that of the UNHCR’s Handbook. It might be that 
mentions of the evaluation of subjective element were not intended to 
emphasize the mind-set of a person but nonetheless that kind of interpretation 
would sit awkwardly with the general aim of the Refugee Convention, which is 
to grant refugees as broad protection as possible. It would also seriously limit 
the scope of humanitarian protection if not all those whose life or freedom is 
threatened were protected but instead only those that exhibit subjective 
emotions of fear. Thus this thesis adopts a stance that focuses on the objective 
evaluation of the element of risk. Naturally it must still be demanded that the 
applicant make at least one statement regarding the risk for his safety for a State 
to be able to reflect that statement to the objective situation60. 
 
How probable must the risk of persecution be for the prohibition on 
refoulement to apply? This is a tricky question since it seems to be impossible 
to say in measurable terms or in the form of “a probability calculus”61. What 
can be requested is that the applicant establishes his fear of persecution to a 
                                                 
56   Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 105. This conclusion follows after an analysis of various 
practical difficulties and risks that have been identified in case law regarding the evaluation 
of subjective fear of persecution.  
57   Wouters 2009, p. 84 (footnote 292). 
58   Ibid. p. 84. The definition of fear is based on an official Oxford dictionary, see 
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/fear>. Accessed on 11.4.2016. 
59   Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 105. 
60   This condition stems from the view that knowledge of conditions of the applicant’s country 
of origin isn’t a “primary objective”. See UNHCR Handbook 2011, paragraph 42. 
61   Wouters 2009, p. 85. 
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reasonable degree62. Reasonable degree, or in other words “a real chance”, 
means that it is not required to show that the persecution would be more 
probable to occur than not. It only requires that persecution is a reasonable 
possibility, and thus protection from refoulement can be granted even when the 
persecution is more likely not to occur than to occur. Thus the threshold for risk 
can be seen as relatively low but rightly so since the grave consequences of an 
erroneous evaluation should be prevented by giving the benefit of doubt to the 
applicant63. 
 
Many factors influence the evaluation whether a fear of persecution is 
established to a reasonable degree. Past episodes in the country of origin 
concerning the applicant himself or his friends, relatives and social or racial 
group as well as the laws and their application in that country are significant 
factors. Also relevant are the applicant’s personal characteristics such as 
background, influence and outspokenness.64 It is important to note that it is not 
required that some harm has already occurred to the applicant but if it has, it 
greatly enhances his claims65. Indeed, the risk can be assumed to be established 
sufficiently if the applicant has suffered persecution in the past, even if it is a 
refutable assumption66. It seems that it does not matter when or how the risk 
develops, and thus a person can be granted protection from refoulement even in 
cases where the risk has manifested itself after the applicant has left his country 
of origin (refugees sur place)67. 
                                                 
62   UNHCR Handbook 2011, paragraph 42. This view is supported also by the preparatory 
work of the Refugee Convention, see UN doc. E/AC.32/L.2 1950, paragraph 2 (b). 
Influential case law from common law countries such as the United States, Canada and the 
United Kingdom has also confirmed this kind of interpretation for the element of risk, see 
Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 111 – 113. 
63   Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 114. Regarding the principle of benefit of doubt, see for 
instance UNHCR Handbook 2011, paragraph 196. 
64   UNHCR Handbook 2011, paragraph 43. At exceptional situations there can occur “group 
determination” of a risk to persecution which puts less focus on the individual traits of an 
applicant, see UNHCR Handbook 2011, paragraph 44. 
65   Wouters 2009, p. 85. 
66   UNHCR Handbook 2011, paragraph 45. Grahl-Madsen 1966, p. 176. 
67   UNCHR Handbook 2011, paragraph 94. Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, p. 65. 
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As already mentioned, the assessment of the risk requires that the applicant 
makes statements regarding his situation. Thus the primary focus of the 
assessment is on the evaluation of these statements68. This assessment of the 
applicant’s statements has been divided into three parts: internal credibility, 
plausibility and supporting evidence. Furthermore, internal credibility has also 
been divided into three parts: statements’ consistency, coherence and relevant 
details.69 It has been observed that at least these factors may reduce the 
credibility: withholding information or personal history data, submitting new 
information in a second interview, unwillingness to supply information, 
inappropriate behavior, deliberate destruction of a passport or other 
documentation and inability to name the transit countries through which the 
applicant has travelled. UNHCR has recommended that States should focus 
only on such contradictions or discrepancies that are fundamental or critical to 
the applicant’s claims. Of important is also to take note that such errors may 
have a rational explanation such as in situations where the applicant is a victim 
of torture or trauma, and if that is the case there must be more reliance on the 
objective facts available.70 Other explanations can be issues such as confusion, 
fear, nervousness, tiredness, embarrassment, depression or memory loss71. 
Although the applicant has the primary burden of proof and he has to support 
his claims with every evidence available, it has to be taken into account that 
refugees often possess very little or no evidence in the country of refuge 
because of the conditions of their flight from their country of origin. Thus the 
country of refuge often has to share the responsibility of evaluating relevant 
facts and producing necessary evidence.72 
 
                                                 
68   UNHCR Handbook 2011, paragraph 37. 
69   Wouters 2009, p. 91. 
70   UNHCR 1995, p. 88. See also Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 147, where it is argued that 
Courts generally have not allowed the credibility be challenged by “peripheral” issues such 
as a travel route to the asylum State. 
71   Cohen 2001, p. 293 – 309. 
72   UNHCR Handbook 2011, paragraph 196. 
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Even if it is established that a person has well-founded fear of persecution, 
there remains the issue of the availability of national protection, in other words, 
the internal protection alternative. Article 1 (A) (2) of the Refugee Convention 
requires that a person must be “unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country”. This has been described as the 
protection clause which asks the question: is there affirmative protection 
available in the country of origin despite the established fear of persecution73? 
If a person is unable to avail himself of the protection of his country of origin 
that State is either unwilling or unable to provide that protection. A State can be 
regarded as unwilling to provide protection for many reasons. The reasons 
include situations where the State is itself clearly responsible for the 
persecution, it encourages or condones the persecution performed by lower 
governing bodies of a State or it tolerates or silently approves the persecution 
performed by non-State agents. When a State is unable to provide protection it 
usually implies that the persecution is done by non-State actors that are outside 
the control of a State. It would seem that nowadays it is largely accepted that 
protection from refoulement covers also these kind of situations and thus is not 
necessary for the persecution to emanate from only State actors for the principle 
of non-refoulement to activate.74 
 
                                                 
73   Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 341 – 342. See also UNHCR 2001, p. 17 (endnote 28) and 
UNHCR 2007, p. 58. Although domestic legislations and interpretations have argued that 
the internal protection alternative could be included in the assessment of the fear of 
persecution, Hathaway and Foster are, however, convincing in proving otherwise. First of 
all, it would be logically false and against common sense to assume that a fear of 
persecution couldn’t exist if protection can be found in some region of the country of origin. 
Secondly, it would often lead to a situation where an applicant would have to establish a real 
chance of country wide persecution, which would be an unreasonable burden. Thirdly, it 
could mean that there would exist an implicit duty for the applicant to, if possible, 
continuously hide and relocate himself in the country of origin, which would be against the 
object and purpose of the Refugee Convention. Lastly, it would encourage domestic 
decision-makers to move directly to the question of internal protection, bypassing the 
primary assessment of the nature of the applicant’s claim. See Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 
336 – 339. 
74   Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 297 – 303 and p. 305. Wide acceptance of this interpretation 
stems from treaty interpretation rules and influential case law. See also UNHCR Handbook 
2011, paragraph 65. The broad definition of “persecution” discussed earlier in section 
2.2.2.3 affirms this view as well. 
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At least four factors can be identified when evaluating whether an internal 
protection alternative exists for a person who has a well-found fear of 
persecution. Firstly, the protection area must be practically (no physical barriers 
etc.), safely (the route must not include the area of persecution) and legally 
(travel, enter and remain in the area is legal) accessible. Secondly, there must be 
clear evidence that the persecutors have no reach to the protection area, no new 
threats of persecution will arise and that exceptional circumstances explain the 
failure of the country of origin in disposing of the localized persecution. 
Thirdly, it must be possible for the person to live in the protection area without 
unreasonable hardships, and thus for instance the safety and security, economic 
survival and the human rights situation in the protection area must be taken into 
account.75 The last, and most controversial, factor is diplomatic assurances, 
where a State from whose area the well-founded fear of persecution emanates 
guarantees the safety of a person with the aim of enabling that person to live in 
that country despite the fear of persecution. It seems that the use of diplomatic 
assurances in the context of the Refugee Convention should be limited only to 
cases where they are provided by the country of origin of its own initiative and 
when a refugee claim is still undetermined76. It is, however, questionable 
whether they should be acknowledged at all even at that point, since the 
declaratory nature of the refugee definition obliges States to protect 
unrecognized refugees from refoulement as if they were refugees, and thus no 
distinction should be made between unrecognized and recognized refugees77. 
These assurances would appear to have relevance only in the situation where an 
exception clause to the prohibition of refoulement applies and the refugee is 
being deported on the basis of that exception clause. Thus it would seem that 
diplomatic assurances should have limited relevance in the context of the 
Refugee Convention. 
 
                                                 
75   UNHCR July 2003, paragraphs 10 – 30. 
76   UNHCR 2006, paragraphs 30 and 39. 
77   Wouters 2009, p. 111 – 112. Confirming the prohibition on this kind of distinction, see 
UNHCR 2006, paragraph 35. See also section 2.2.2.1. 
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2.2.2.5 Exceptions (article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention)78 
The prohibition on refoulement is not absolute in the context of the Refugee 
Convention79. According to the article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention the 
protection from refoulement “may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom 
there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the 
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that 
country”. Evident from the text is that full proof of the danger that a refugee 
poses is not required, instead there only needs to exist reasonable grounds for 
such a conclusion. The drafters explicitly mentioned that the formulation of 
“reasonable grounds” is necessary for States to be able to determine whether a 
refugee poses a sufficient danger or not80. The burden of proof of establishing 
reasonable grounds is on the State81. This exception clause must be interpreted 
restrictively and proportionately82. Proportionality requires that a rational 
connection between the refoulement and the elimination of the danger exists, 
refoulement is the last possible resort to eliminate the danger and that the 
danger to the country of refuge outweighs the risk that refoulement causes to 
                                                 
78   It is necessary to remind here that the Refugee Convention includes additional exceptions to 
the principle of non-refoulement indirectly in its Article 1 (C), (D) and (F) by not allowing 
the application of the Convention to refugees that are already protected in some other way 
or have committed war crimes, crimes against peace or humanity, serious non-political 
crimes or acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. This thesis will 
not go into detail regarding these refugee status exclusion clauses, since their effect is not 
limited to exclusion from the protection of non-refoulement but instead causes the exclusion 
of all refugee rights in the Refugee Convention. Their inclusion would also needlessly 
broaden the scope of the thesis, which focuses purely on the content of the principle of non-
refoulement. 
79   It should be noted that it has been proposed that a trend, which has strengthened since 1951, 
against exceptions regarding the principle of non-refoulement makes the application of 
exceptions nearly impossible, or possible only in “circumstances of overriding importance”. 
However, even this kind of interpretation does not “warrant reading the 1951 Convention 
without them”. See Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003, p. 132 – 133.  
80   UN doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16 1951, third Statement by the representative of the United 
Kingdom (Mr.   Hoare). 
81   Wouters 2009, p. 113. 
82   Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003, p. 134; Bruin and Wouters 2003, p. 17; UNHCR 2006, p. 
1. See also section 2.1 of this thesis regarding the interpretation of human rights treaties. 
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the refugee83. This exception can be divided into two parts: the first comprising 
of the phrase “danger to the security of the country in which he is” and the 
second of “having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious 
crime, constituting a danger to the community of that country”. It is necessary 
to examine these parts next in detail and separately to clarify the exception 
clause. 
 
In case law the ”danger to the security of the country” - clause has be seen as 
including acts that promote or encourage violent activity which is targeted at 
the refugee State, its system of government, or its people (regardless of 
location) directly or indirectly (such as overthrowing a foreign government if 
that results in actions that threaten the security of the refugee State or its 
nationals)84. This could be called a narrow interpretation. On another influential 
case it was argued that ”a danger to the security of the country” should not be 
limited only to the safety of the refugee State but instead be extended to the 
protection of that State's international relations and obligations85. This kind of 
broad interpretation can be seen as a reaction to the modern security threats 
raised by international terrorism. However, UNHCR and authoritative scholars 
have argued that the exception to the principle of non-refoulement provided by 
the Article 33 (2) (first part) of the Refugee Convention applies only when the 
security of the refugee State is seriously endangered, and thus it excludes 
situations where other countries or the international community is threatened86. 
This narrow view is also supported by the precise phrasing of the Article 33 (2). 
Since the principle of non-refoulement and the Refugee Convention in general 
aims at protecting the fundamental human rights of refugees, the possible 
exceptions to this principle should be interpreted narrowly rather than broadly. 
Thus the “danger to security of the country” - clause should only concern 
                                                 
83   UNHCR 2006, p. 7. 
84   Rehman v. Home Secretary, INLR 517, 528, Special Immigration Appeal Commission, 
1999. 
85   Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) SCC 1. File No.: 27790, 2002. 
86   Grahl-Madsen 1997, p. 140; Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003, p. 135; Hathaway 2005, p. 
346; UNHCR 2006, p. 4 – 5. 
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situations where it can be clearly proven that there exists a serious threat to the 
refuge State's security. Not only should the danger be serious but rather very 
serious, since an interpretation consistent with the refugee status exclusion 
article 1 (F) demands setting the threshold for danger in this article high87.  
 
The second part of the Article 33(2) exception concerns situations when a 
refugee has been convicted by a judgment of a crime and is viewed as a threat 
to the refuge State's community. It has been proposed that this rule applies only 
to crimes committed after the refugee has been admitted to the country of 
refuge as a refugee since the refugee status exclusion article 1 (F) (b) already 
concerns crimes committed before the admittance88. I agree with this 
proposition since it would not appear logical to include identical situations in 
these two different articles.  It is important to note that the judgment must be 
final – meaning that appeal rights should have expired or been exhausted89. It 
has been recommended that refugee States should investigate the fairness of the 
procedures that resulted in convictions in another States to ensure that the status 
of a final judgment has been achieved properly90. While this recommendation 
sounds reasonable and fair, there could be some practical issues in how to 
ensure this. For instance, UNHCR has viewed murder, rape and armed robbery 
as “serious” crimes91. Since it is required that the crime is “particularly 
serious”, it has been argued that even when a serious crime has been committed 
all mitigating and other circumstances must be taken into account before 
concluding that this exception can be applied92.  Finally, in addition to the 
conviction, the refugee must also pose a threat to the community of the refuge 
State, in other words, there must exist “a causal link between the crime and the 
                                                 
87   Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003, p. 136. 
88   Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003, p. 130. 
89   UN doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16 1951, fourth Statement by the representative of the United 
Kingdom (Mr. Hoare).   
90   Hathaway and Harvey 2001, p. 292.  
91   UNHCR September 2003, p. 5. 
92   Hathaway 2005, p. 350. In other terms, it has been argued that the danger should mean “very 
serious danger”. See Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003, p. 140. 
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danger”93. Thus in my opinion separate evidence of the threat that a convicted 
refugee poses should be required from the refugee State. The refuge State 
should in its consideration take into account different factors such as the length 
of time that has passed since the refugee's conviction and the actions of the 
refugee after his conviction94. 
 
The exceptions are perhaps the clearest indications of gaps in refugee protection 
concerning the Refugee Convention regime. A refugee is not granted protection 
from refoulement in two situations: either there are reasonable grounds for 
regarding that person as a danger to the security of the country or that person, 
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of that country. This gap is justified by 
the right for a State to defend itself from persons who are likely to cause danger 
to that State in one way or another. It has become clear that the formulation of 
these exceptions leave open the possibility for States to interpret them widely 
although in refugee law exceptions should always be interpreted narrowly to 
ensure that protection is afforded to those in need of it. As such, these 
exceptions can lead to serious gaps in refugee protection and it is especially 
problematic if they are applied in situations where the connection between the 
refugee and the danger is vague or indirect. 
 
2.3 European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
2.3.1 General introduction to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (later referred to as ECHR) was adopted by the Council 
                                                 
93   Wouters 2009, p. 117. 
94   Grahl-Madsen 1997, p. 142 – 143. I agree especially with the following statement: “a link 
may hardly be said to exist if a considerable time has passed between the commission of the 
crime and the time of decision”. 
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of Europe on 1950 and came into force on 1953. Unlike the Refugee 
Convention, ECHR is a regional treaty that secures human rights not only to 
refugees but to everyone within the jurisdiction of the States parties to it. ECHR 
has been ratified by 47 States95. ECHR can be described as the most important 
human rights instrument in Europe because it has been so broadly ratified, and 
it contains a a long history with impressive case law of a binding nature96. It 
contains obligations that are of an objective nature and thus the focus of its 
protection is not on the interests of the contracting States but on the 
fundamental rights of individuals97. It consists of three sections and 59 articles, 
of which 17 articles fall under the section “Rights and Freedoms”. Although 
initially quite sparse in its content, ECHR has been complimented to date by 16 
protocols, which have either modified the Convention system or expanded the 
rights that can be protected. 
 
Crucial to the success of ECHR is the European Court of Human Rights (later 
referred to as ECtHR) which, according to article 19 of ECHR, is a permanent 
judicial body that observes that the contracting States follow the obligations 
enumerated in ECHR. According to article 32 ECtHR has the jurisdiction on all 
matters concerning the interpretation and application of ECHR and the 
Protocols. According to article 46 the judgments of ECtHR are binding. Alleged 
breaches of the provisions of ECHR may be submitted either in inter-State 
cases (article 33) or individual applications (article 34), the latter being far more 
popular than the former. Other organs related to the Council of Europe or 
ECHR such as the Committee of Ministers and Secretary General have very 
little or no relevance to the interpretation of the principle of non-refoulement in 
the context of ECHR. Thus in my analysis I will focus purely on the case law of 
ECtHR, including the former European Commission on Human Rights in one 
case. 
                                                 
95   Council of Europe: Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 005, 2016. 
96   Wouters 2009, p. 191. 
97   Orakhelashvili 2003, p. 531. 
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When interpreting the prohibition on refoulement in the context of ECHR, there 
are a few general principles that one should take into account. Firstly, the 
principle of effectiveness implies that ECHR should be applied and interpreted 
in a way to guarantee its safeguards’ practicality and effectivity. In other words, 
it should be realistic for individuals to enjoy human rights.98 Secondly, rights 
guaranteed by ECHR should be interpreted liberally or progressively, and thus 
the restrictions on those rights should be interpreted narrowly99. Thirdly, there 
is no margin of appreciation when interpreting rights that are absolute, like the 
prohibition of torture (article 3). This important principle stems from article 15 
of ECHR that prohibits derogation of some rights even in a time of emergency. 
Fourthly, article 53 of ECHR States that “Nothing in this Convention shall be 
construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High 
Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a party”. The 
adherence to this principle of respecting international law on the same subject 
matter has been highlighted by ECtHR on many occasions, for instance when it 
refers to the Refugee Convention or CAT in its judgment100.  And last, but 
certainly not the least, is the principle of evolutive interpretation. It means that 
ECHR should be considered a living instrument in the sense that its content 
changes over time through evolutive interpretation that takes into account 
important social and technical changes in society101. This principle is often 
outlined by ECtHR in its numerous judgments102. To understand the protection 
                                                 
98   Jacobs and White and Ovey 2010, p. 74. See also for instance Klass and Others v. Germany 
5029/71, European Court of Human Rights, 1978, at paragraph 34. 
99   See for instance Wemhoff v. Germany 2122/64, European Court of Human Rights, 1968, 
under the section “AS TO THE LAW”, paragraph 8. The Court Stated that “Given that it is a 
law-making treaty, it is also necessary to seek the interpretation that is most appropriate in 
order to realise the aim and achieve the object of the treaty, not that which would restrict to 
the greatest possible degree the obligations undertaken by the Parties”. 
100 See for instance Soering v. United Kingdom 14038/88, European Court of Human Rights, 
1989, where reference is made to CAT at paragraph 88. This case is later referred to as 
“Soering v. United Kingdom”. 
101 Dzehtsiarou 2011, p. 1731.  
102 See for instance Tyrer v. United Kingdom 5856/72, European Court of Human Rights, 1978, 
where evolutive interpretation is stressed at paragraph 31. This case is later referred to as 
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that ECHR affords, one should always in addition to reading the text of the 
ECHR take into account the case law developed by ECtHR. In some cases, 
ECHR does not explicitly protect a specific right in its text, but instead that 
right has been interpreted to be implicitly included in another right that is 
codified in the text. For instance, this is the case for the right of non-
refoulement which I will next evaluate in the context of ECHR. 
 
 
 
2.3.2 The principle of non-refoulement in the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
2.3.2.1 An overview of the principle of non-refoulement 
The Council of Europe acknowledged that there exists a prohibition on 
refoulement under ECHR for the first time in 1965, when it recommended that 
Article 3 “binds Contracting Parties not to return refugees to a country where 
their life or freedom would be threatened.”103. This kind of recommendation for 
the application of article 3 can be seen as very important since the text of that 
article leaves room for interpretation, sparsely stating: “No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
Article 3 (nor any other article in ECHR) does not contain an explicit right to be 
protected from refoulement and thus the protection afforded by ECHR can be 
viewed as “indirect”104. This kind of indirect responsibility has been supported 
by the idea that when a State removes an individual without his will to an area 
where that individual risks being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment that State is a “crucial link in the chain of events”105. I 
strongly concur with this view. 
                                                                                                                                  
“Tyrer v. United Kingdom”. 
103 Council of Europe 1965, paragraph 3. 
104 McAdam 2007, p. 137. 
105 Vermeulen 2006, p. 429. 
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In 1989, 24 years after the recommendation, ECtHR addressed the prohibition 
on refoulement for the first time in the case Soering v. the United Kingdom. In 
this case the United States of America (later referred to as USA) requested that 
a person be extradited from United Kingdom (later referred to as UK) to USA. 
The court found that the extradition would be a violation of article 3 because of 
the extreme conditions that the extradited individual would have to suffer in 
death row in USA106. Subsequently, ECtHR has addressed non-refoulement in 
the context of asylum107 and in expulsion cases108 as well. Thus it has become 
clear that article 3 obliges States and protects individuals also in an indirect 
way, in other words, in the form of prohibition on refoulement. In addition to 
article 3, ECtHR has acknowledged that a prohibition on refoulement can exist 
at least under article 2 (right to life)109 and article 6 (right to fair trial)110 as well. 
However, it is uncertain whether these other rights should be evaluated 
separately or always only analogously under article 3111. 
 
When discussing the principle of non-refoulement in the context of ECHR, I 
will limit the scope on article 3 since it is by far the most significant and 
influential right in ECHR that protects individuals from refoulement. Similar to 
chapter 2.2, the prohibition on refoulement can be seen as consisting of 
                                                 
106 Soering v. the United Kingdom, paragraph 111. 
107 Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden 15576/89, European Court of Human Rights, 1991. The 
Court found    no violation of article 3 on this case. This case is later referred to as “Cruz 
Varas and Others v. Sweden”. 
108 Chahal v. United Kingdom 22414/93, European Court of Human Rights, 1996. The Court 
found that the expulsion of the applicant would violate article 3. This case is later referred to 
as “Chahal v. United Kingdom”. 
109 For instance, Bader and Others v. Sweden 13284/04, European Court of Human Rights, 
2005. This case is later referred to as “Bader and Others v. Sweden”. 
110 For instance, Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain 12747/87, European Court of Human 
Rights, 1992. 
111 ECtHR has examined article 2 and article 3 separately in the case Bader and Others v. 
Sweden, see paragraph 42. However, the Court has argued that when the complaints raised 
under article 2 are indissociable from the substance of the complaint under article 3, it is not 
necessary to examine the complaint under article 2 separately, see D. v. United 
Kingdom 146/1996/767/964, European Court of Human Rights, 1997, paragraph 59. This 
case is later referred to as “D. v. United Kingdom”. 
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different elements which will be evaluated next separately. I will begin with the 
prohibition’s personal and territorial scope, which will be followed by the 
assessment of what is the harm from which a person is protected. Then the 
element of risk will be scrutinized and lastly there will be brief conclusions 
regarding the character of the principle of non-refoulement in the context of 
ECHR. 
 
2.3.2.2 Personal and (extra-) territorial scope 
Article 1 of ECHR declares that the rights and freedoms contained in it are 
secured to everyone within the jurisdiction of the States party to it. This means 
that for a person to be protected that person does not need to be a national of 
any State party to the Convention. The legal status of a person is irrelevant, and 
thus for instance Stateless persons and illegal aliens are granted protection112. 
Since the text of article 3 does not limit its personal scope, persons are 
protected from refoulement in the broad sense declared in article 1 of ECHR. 
 
It is clear that the territorial scope includes those who are present within any 
area of the territory of a State party to ECHR113. In addition, according to article 
56 of ECHR a State may extend this territorial scope “to all or any of the 
territories for whose international relations it is responsible”114. ECtHR has 
denied the possibility of a State generally limiting the territorial scope with a 
reservation although at the same time it has acknowledged the prospect that a 
State might have reduced responsibility in special circumstances115. 
International or transit zones such as airports do not limit the territorial scope 
                                                 
112 See for instance Siliadin v. France 73316/01, European Court of Human Rights, 2005, where 
the applicant was an illegal alien and the Court confirmed that she is protected by ECHR. 
113 See for instance VCLT article 29: “Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is 
otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory”. 
114 This has been done for instance by Denmark in respect to Greenland. Wouters 2009, p. 204. 
115 Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia 48787/99, European Court of Human Rights, 2004, 
paragraph 333. This case is later referred to as “Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia”. 
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but instead they are a part of a State’s territory116. ECtHR has also stated that it 
is irrelevant whether a person enters a State’s territory in a technical sense, as 
long as that person is physically present there117. 
 
In addition to territorial responsibility, States also have extra-territorial 
responsibility. This kind of responsibility can emerge in two scenarios. First, it 
can be established when a State exercises effective control over a foreign 
territory118.  Secondly, extra-territorial responsibility is activated when a 
conduct can be attributed to a State (for instance when State officials perform 
the conduct) if that conduct includes controlling a person and his rights119. For 
the principle of non-refoulement this means that even when a person seeking 
protection is not inside the territory of a State, that State has to protect the 
person if extra-territorial responsibility is established. For instance, States are 
bound by article 3 of ECHR when encountering people on the sea areas outside 
their territorial waters120.  
 
All in all, it can be concluded that the principle of non-refoulement has a very 
broad personal, territorial and extra-territorial scope in the context of ECHR. A 
person seeking protection is not required to be outside his country of origin, and 
technical issues in reaching the jurisdiction of a State is not crucial. The essence 
lies in the factual authority or responsibility of a State. 
 
It must be noted here that one gap in refugee protection concerning the ECHR 
                                                 
116 Amuur v. France 17/1995/523/609, European Court of Human Rights, 1996, paragraph 52. 
117 D v. United Kingdom, paragraph 48. 
118 See for instance Loizidou v. Turkey 40/1993/435/514, European Court of Human 
Rights, 1995, where the Court considered Turkey responsible for its actions in Northern 
Cyprus. See also Issa and Others v. Turkey 31821/96, European Court of Human Rights, 
2004, where ECtHR found that effective control wasn’t established because the control was 
lacking in both personnel and covered area width.  
119 See for instance Öcalan v. Turkey 46221/99, European Court of Human Rights, 2003, where 
the Court found Turkey responsible for its officials’ conduct outside its territory. 
120 See Xhavara and Others v. Italy and Albania 39473/98, European Court of Human Rights, 
2001. 
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stems from the regional nature of the treaty. Unlike Refugee Convention or 
CAT, only European States can be contracting States of ECHR. Thus a refugee 
is not protected by ECHR if the responsible State is located outside Europe 
since in that case that State cannot be a contracting State of this treaty. 
 
2.3.2.3 The harm from which a person is protected 
Article 3 of ECHR protects a person from torture, inhuman treatment or 
punishment or degrading treatment or punishment. These three forms of ill-
treatment are not defined in the Convention. ECtHR has distinguished torture 
from inhuman or degrading treatment based on their difference in the “intensity 
of the suffering inflicted”. Torture can be seen as the most intense form of ill-
treatment because it is especially deliberate, serious and cruel.121 If ill-treatment 
does not qualify as torture, one must assess whether it qualifies as inhuman 
treatment or punishment. If it is not qualified as that either, the final assessment 
will be whether it is degrading treatment or punishment.122 I will next analyze 
these different forms of ill-treatment separately, firstly torture and then inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment. It should be noted that the focus here is 
in determining what elements does the ill-treatment need to possess for it to 
qualify as either torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
regardless of whether the case law referred to has a refoulement context or not. 
The context isn’t crucial here because it has been argued that neither the text of 
article 3 nor the object and purpose of ECHR indicate that a different standard 
should be applied in refoulement cases123. Indeed, it has been explicitly stated 
that article 3 is equally absolute in cases involving deportation124. However, in 
refoulement cases the question of the perpetrator of the ill-treatment, in other 
words the source of the conduct, proscribed by article 3 is not relevant at all 
                                                 
121 Ireland v. United Kingdom 5310/71, European Court of Human Rights, 1978, paragraph 167. 
Later referred to as Ireland v. United Kingdom. 
122 Tyrer v. United Kingdom, paragraphs 29 – 30. 
123 Wouters 2009, p. 242. 
124 D. and Others v. Turkey 24245/03, European Court of Human Rights, 2006, paragraph 45. 
This document was only available in French and hence the translated meaning is taken from 
Wouters 2009, p. 242.  
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since the responsibility of a State is activated when an individual is exposed to a 
real risk, not when the proscribed ill-treatment itself occurs125. 
 
If a conduct is viewed as torture its effect on a person should be very serious, 
consisting of cruel pain or suffering either physical or mentally126. According to 
ECtHR the assessment regarding the level of ill-treatment is relative because it 
is dependent on the circumstances and the context of the case127.  Factors that 
can be relevant for assessing the severity of ill-treatment include duration of 
treatment, physical or mental effects, sex, age and state of health of the 
victim128. There seems to be some ambiguity regarding the issue of intent as a 
requirement for a conduct to be seen as torture. In many cases ECtHR seems to 
emphasize whether a treatment was deliberately inflicted, thus focusing on the 
intent of the perpetrators129 while in some cases it has viewed that sufficiently 
serious and cruel acts qualify as torture without a mention of the element of 
intent130. Thus, both the intent of the perpetrators and the particularly serious or 
cruel nature of the suffering of the victim have influenced the assessment 
whether ill-treatment is qualified as torture. The source of the conduct, in other 
words whether torture was carried out, instigated or consented by public 
officials, does not seem to be relevant even in another context than refoulement, 
since ECtHR has included ill-treatment that is performed by private individuals 
under the scope of article 3131. 
 
Treatment or punishment can be considered inhuman if it was premeditated, 
applied for hours and caused physical injury or intense suffering of either 
                                                 
125 Soering v. United Kingdom, paragraph 91. 
126 Selmouni v. France 25803/94, European Court of Human Rights, 1999, paragraph 105. This 
case is later referred to as “Selmouni v. France”. 
127 Tyrer v. United Kingdom, paragraph 30. 
128 Selmouni v. France, paragraph 100. 
129 Such as Aksoy v. Turkey 100/1995/606/694, European Court of Human Rights, 1996, 
paragraph 64. This case is later referred to as “Aksoy v. Turkey”. 
130 Such as Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, paragraph 440. 
131 Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey 22535/93, European Court of Human Rights, 2000, paragraph 115. 
This case is later referred to as “Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey”. 
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physical or mental kind. For treatment or punishment to be viewed as degrading 
it should arouse feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority in the victims, thus 
being capable of humiliating and debasing them.132 It is interesting to note that 
a sufficiently real and immediate threat of torture may constitute inhuman 
treatment itself133. Unlike torture, the intent or purpose of the perpetrator is not 
viewed as a decisive factor when determining whether a treatment or 
punishment is inhuman or degrading134. It has been argued that the consent of 
the victim can revoke the prohibited nature of a treatment or punishment that is 
objectively viewed as inhuman or degrading135. In my opinion taking note of 
the consent of the victim sounds reasonable albeit it should be relevant only in 
cases where the ill-treatment was mild in its intensity, and thus it should not be 
applicable in cases where the prohibited act is considered aggravated. Similar to 
torture, the assessment of a minimum level of severity in ill-treatment is relative 
and thus depends, for instance, on the duration of treatment, physical or mental 
effects, sex, age and state of health of the victim136. Again, like torture, who the 
perpetrator of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is does not have a 
crucial relevance even in another context than refoulement since ECtHR has 
included ill-treatment that is performed by private individuals under the scope 
of article 3137. 
 
 
2.3.2.4 The element of risk 
                                                 
132 Kudla v. Poland 30210/96, European Court of Human Rights, 2000, paragraph 92. 
133 Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom 7511/76; 7743/76, European Court of Human 
Rights, 1982, paragraph 26. 
134 Regarding inhuman treatment or punishment see for instance Selcuk and Asker v. Turkey 
23184/94; 23185/94, European Court of Human Rights, 1998, paragraph 79. This case is 
later referred to as “Selcuk and Asker v. Turkey”. Regarding degrading treatment or 
punishment see for instance Labita v. Italy 26772/95, European Court of Human 
Rights, 2000, paragraph 120. This case is later referred to as “Labita v. Italy”. 
135 Vermeulen 2006, p. 419. 
136 Regarding inhuman treatment or punishment see for instance Selcuk and Asker v. Turkey, 
paragraph 76. Regarding degrading treatment or punishment see for instance Labita v. Italy, 
paragraph 120. 
137 See for instance A v. United Kingdom 25599/94, European Court of Human Rights, 1998, 
paragraph 22. 
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In cases concerning refoulement a State’s responsibility under article 3 is 
essentially determined by “the act of exposing an individual to the risk of ill-
treatment”138. On one hand full certainty or even high probability regarding the 
ill-treatment is not required but on the other hand a mere possibility is not 
sufficient. What is sufficient is that the ill-treatment is foreseeable, realistic and 
personal. The risk must be foreseeable at the time of the expulsion or 
extradition by assessing what facts were known or ought to have been known 
by the State at that time, even though the Court may consider information 
which becomes available after that point of time.139 Similar to the Refugee 
Convention, this assessment of the element of risk can be seen as crucial in the 
case law of ECtHR concerning article 3 and non-refoulement. The burden of 
proof can be seen as both on the applicant since it is he or she who has to 
submit the relevant material and information140 and on the State expulsing or 
extraditing that refugee when that State is assessing the risk of ill-treatment141. 
It is necessary next to scrutinize this risk assessment in several parts. I will 
firstly go through the substantive or material part, where the main question is 
what kind of elements and reasons have been seen as establishing the 
foreseeable, realistic and personal risk of ill-treatment. After that the 
evidentiary standard will be analyzed, including credibility and material 
evidence. Lastly the question of national protection will be discussed, including 
internal protection alternative and the use of diplomatic assurances. 
 
As previously mentioned, the risk of ill-treatment needs to be foreseeable, 
realistic and personal. This has been seen as implying that the risk is 
                                                 
138 Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, paragraph 76. 
139 Vilvarajah and Others v. United Kingdom 45/1990/236/302-306, European Court of Human 
Rights, 1991, paragraphs 107 – 108 and 111. This case is later referred to as “Vilvarajah and 
Others v. Sweden”. 
140 Said v. Netherlands 2345/02, European Court of Human Rights, 2005, paragraph 49. This 
case is later referred to as “Said v. Netherlands”. 
141 Soering v. United Kingdom, paragraph 91. It is important to note that even though the 
primary responsibility regarding the assessment of the risk is on the State, ECtHR allows 
itself to independently re-assess relevant facts and circumstances when necessary. See 
Wouters 2009, p. 285. 
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prospective: it is both objectively realistic and has a connection to the 
individual concerned142. It is important to note that a subjective feeling of fear 
is relevant only if it is based on a substantial, objective basis143. Both belonging 
to a group and individual reasons can either alone or cumulatively establish that 
the risk of ill-treatment is foreseeable144. In addition, in “most extreme cases of 
general violence” the general violent conditions in a country may be sufficient 
to establish a foreseeable risk of ill-treatment even without any individual or 
group considerations145. In the case law of ECtHR political activities and past 
experiences of ill-treatment related to the applicant are often relevant, although 
their relevance is dependent on their type, duration, frequency and time of 
occurring as well as events occurring after them146. Naturally information 
regarding the general conditions of a country is relevant as well, such as its 
political and institutional situation, level of violence, plight of refugees, army 
practices, law enforcement agencies and human rights situation147. Finally, the 
actions of an applicant sur place, in other words after his departure from the 
country of origin, may have relevance for establishing a foreseeable risk of ill-
treatment, although it is unclear how ECtHR views the situation where an 
applicant intentionally creates a risk sur place148. However, it has been argued 
                                                 
142 Wouters 2009, p. 247. 
143 Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, paragraph 84. 
144 Vilvarajah and Others v. Sweden, paragraph 112, where the Court found that no “special 
distinguishing features” existed to contribute to the risk of ill-treatment when a mere 
membership of a group did not suffice. Saadi v. Italy 37201/06, European Court of Human 
Rights, 2008, paragraph 132, where ECtHR found that a mere membership of a group did 
suffice for establishing a foreseeable risk of ill-treatment. This case is later referred to as 
“Saadi v. Italy”. 
145 NA. v. United Kingdom 25904/07, European Court of Human Rights, 2008, paragraph 115. 
This case is later referred to as “NA. v. United Kingdom”. 
146 Wouters 2009, p. 262 – 263. See for instance cases such as Kandomabadi v. Netherlands 
6276/03; 6122;04 (admissibility decision), European Court of Human Rights, 2004, where 
the applicant had participated in student demonstrations and Thampibillai v. Netherlands 
61350/00, European Court of Human Rights, 2004, where the applicant had been previously 
arrested and detained. The latter case will later be referred to as “Thampibillai v. 
Nethelands”. 
147 Wouters 2009, p. 264. See for instance Chahal v. United Kingdom, paragraphs 100 – 103, 
where the situation in Punjab region of India was scrutinized regarding its police force, 
democratic elections, justice system as well as general transparency and accountability. 
148 In the case N v. Finland 38885/02, European Court of Human Rights, 2005, paragraph 165, 
the Court considers the possible effects of the applicant’s activities and publicity in Finland 
to the way he would be treated in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This case is later 
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that to not provide protection from refoulement when the applicant has 
intentionally created the conditions where a foreseeable risk of ill-treatment 
exists would go against the absolute nature of Article 3 of ECHR149. I concur 
with this view, especially when the intentionality of creating a risk is often 
problematic to prove in retrospect and even enabling the use of that kind of 
argument for States would in my opinion indeed go against the absolute 
protection from refoulement that ECHR provides. 
 
In its first refoulement case ECtHR set the starting point for the evidentiary 
standard regarding the foreseeable risk of ill-treatment: the responsibility of a 
State under article 3 is activated when there have been shown “substantial 
grounds for believing” that the ill-treatment is a real risk150. Naturally both the 
credibility of the claim of an applicant and the evidence in support of that claim 
are relevant. Factors such as the detail, comprehensiveness, consistency, 
plausibility and promptly providing relevant information are especially 
important in assessing the credibility151. For instance, remaining silent for a 
prolonged period about previous activities and experiences of ill-treatment as 
well as changing the story has been seen as diminishing the credibility of a 
claim152. However, in refoulement cases ECtHR has pointed out that it cannot 
be expected that persons who are seeking refuge and who very often have 
experienced ill-treatment of some kind have completely accurate information 
regarding their claim153. It can be concluded from the case law of ECtHR that 
only those inconsistencies that relate to the essential part of the claim can 
remarkably diminish the credibility of it154. Regarding the issue of evidence, 
                                                                                                                                  
referred to as “N v. Finland”. 
149 Wouters 2009, p. 266. 
150 Soering v. United Kingdom, paragraph 91. 
151 Wouters 2009, p. 266. 
152 Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, paragraph 78. 
153 Hatami v. Sweden 32448/96, European Commission of Human Rights, 1998, paragraph 106. 
See also Bello v. Sweden 32213/04 (admissibility decision), European Court of Human 
Rights, 2006, page 6. 
154 Said v. Netherlands, paragraph 51, where the Court found the applicant’s arguments 
persuasive regarding the general situation even though there was some ambiguity regarding 
some elements of his personal story. 
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factors such as the type, comprehensiveness, information and consistency of the 
evidence are important, as well as the independence, reliability, objectiveness, 
authority and reputation of the source155. Elements relating to evidence that can 
seriously question a claim’s credibility include, for instance, complete absence 
of relevant material evidence156, relying solely on the letters of a relative for 
indication of a risk of ill-treatment157 and significant delay in submitting or 
even mentioning a relevant document158. In general, ECtHR has highlighted the 
evidential value of human rights information gathered by States’ diplomatic 
missions and the agencies of the United Nations159. 
 
Even when a risk of ill-treatment proscribed by article 3 of ECHR has been 
established, it must be assessed whether the authorities of the receiving State 
are able to eliminate that risk by providing sufficient protection160. This issue of 
national protection can be divided into two situations: internal protection 
alternative and diplomatic assurances. The idea behind internal protection 
alternative is that although the applicant would face a risk of ill-treatment in 
one area of the country of destination, another area of that same country could 
be deemed as safe. It would seem that ECtHR has adopted a rather restricting 
view on the use of internal protection alternative, at least when the risk 
emanates from State actors161. The Court has listed preconditions for relying on 
the internal protection alternative: it must be possible to travel to that protection 
area, gain admittance there and be able to settle there without a possibility of 
                                                 
155 Wouters 2009, p. 271. 
156 Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, paragraph 78. 
157 H.L.R. v. France 11/1996/630/813, European Court of Human Rights, 1997, paragraph 42. 
This case is later referred to as “H.L.R. v. France”. 
158 Nasimi v. Sweden 38865/02 (admissibility decision), European Court of Human 
Rights, 2004, page 8. 
159 NA. v. United Kingdom, paragraph 121. 
160 H.L.R. v France, paragraph 40. 
161 See for instance cases where ECtHR rejected the argument of internal protection alternative: 
Chahal v. United Kingdom, Hilal v. United Kingdom 45276/99, European Court of Human 
Rights, 2001 and Salah Sheekh v. Netherlands 1948/04, European Court of Human 
Rights, 2007 (this case is later referred to as “Salah Sheekh v. Netherlands”).  
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ending up outside that area where a risk of ill-treatment exists162. It has been 
seen as necessary that the protection afforded by the internal protection area be 
both practical and effective163. Diplomatic assurances aim, as their name 
suggests, to assure an extraditing or expulsing State that the person sent to the 
country of destination will not be subjected to ill-treatment proscribed by article 
3 of ECHR. ECtHR has seen it necessary to require a quite demanding standard 
for the effective use of diplomatic assurances: they must at least significantly 
reduce the risk of ill-treatment and thus lower the level of the risk to a 
negligible level164. General good faith regarding diplomatic assurances is not 
deemed sufficient165. Diplomatic assurances seem to have a very restricted 
effect on non-extradition cases166 while on extradition cases they may 
effectively decrease the risk of ill-treatment when the assurances have been 
provided by an institution actually capable of effective prevention of the risk167. 
 
2.3.2.5 The character of the principle of non-refoulement 
The principle of non-refoulement is codified under article 3 of ECHR which 
has an absolute character. This absolute nature of article 3 is concluded from 
several observations. Firstly, the text of article 3 does not allow any limitations 
since it simply States “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” Secondly, article 15 (2) of ECHR 
explicitly prohibits any derogations regarding article 3. Thirdly, it has been 
argued that article 3 is absolute because it is fundamentally aimed at the 
protection of values of such importance that it should not be derogated from 
                                                 
162 Salah Sheekh v. Netherlands, paragraph 141. 
163 Wouters 2009, p. 293. See section 2.2.2.4 for similar requirements in the context of the 
Refugee Convention. Naturally I concur with this view since it would go against the 
absolute nature of the prohibition of refoulement and be illogical to demand less of the 
internal protection alternative in the context of ECHR. 
164 Soering v. United Kingdom, paragraph 93. 
165 Chahal v. United Kingdom, paragraph 105. 
166 See cases such as Chahal v. United Kingdom and Saadi v. Italy. 
167 See cases such as Nivette v. France 44190/98 (admissibility decision), European Court of 
Human Rights, 2001 and Einhorn v. France 71555/01 (admissibility decision), European 
Court of Human Rights, 2001. 
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regardless of the conditions168. Finally, the extensive case law of ECtHR has 
confirmed the absolute nature of article 3 several times during recent 
decades169. However, it must be noted that article 3 has an element of relativity 
in the sense that a minimum level of severity has to be attained, as explained in 
chapter 2.3.2.3. In other words, an assessment must be made of the ill-treatment 
itself by distinguishing merely “harsh” treatment from treatment proscribed by 
article 3. This is different from a proportionality test or the margin of 
appreciation, where the purpose of the action that inflicts harm would be 
weighed against the level of harm suffered, which is not allowed regarding 
article 3.170 
 
Even though it seems clear that the prohibition on refoulement in the context of 
ECHR is absolute, States have tried to challenge this view several times. In one 
case, Governments of Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia and UK questioned the 
absolute nature of article 3 in expulsion cases since the harm was not inflicted 
directly by the State that expelled a person. These States argued in favor of a 
proportionality test and proposed setting a higher standard of proof in cases 
where there was a threat to national security171. It should be noted that a 
proportionality test where the threat to a State would be weighed against the 
harm to a person was famously presented by a State and rejected by the Court 
in a previous case, Chahal v. United Kingdom172. In another case, UK repeated 
                                                 
168 Wouters 2009, p. 314. See also Saadi v. Italy, Concurring Opinion of Judge Myjer, joined by 
Judge Zagrebelsky, where it is argued that “Upholding human rights in the fight against 
terrorism is, first and foremost, a matter of upholding our values, even with regard to those 
who may seek to destroy them”. 
169 See for instance following cases dating from 1989 to 2005, Soering v. United Kingdom, 
paragraph 88; Aksoy v. Turkey, paragraph 62; N v. Finland, paragraph 166. 
170 Wouters 2009, p. 309 – 310. 
171 Ramzy v. Netherlands 25424/05 (admissibility decision), European Court of Human Rights, 
2005, paragraphs 128 and 130. A higher standard of proof, where “the individual concerned 
had to prove that it was “more likely than not” that he would be subjected to treatment 
prohibited by Article 3”, was justified by the interpretation of CAT article 3 which was itself 
based on the case law of ECtHR. Unfortunately, in its decision on merits the Court decided 
to strike the case out of its list because the applicant had disappeared, see Ramzy v. 
Netherlands 25424/04 (judgment/striking out), European Court of Human Rights, 2010. 
172 However, see in the case Chahal v. United Kingdom the Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of 
Judges Gölcüklü, Matscher, Sir John Freeland, Baka, Mifsud Bonnici, Gotchev and Levits, 
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the same points as in the previous case, with the addition that it emphasized the 
usefulness of diplomatic assurances in alleviating the risk of ill-treatment173. 
ECtHR acknowledged the difficulties States face when combatting international 
terrorism, but nonetheless rejected all of United Kingdom’s arguments, 
confirming once again the strict requirements of diplomatic assurances and the 
absolute nature of article 3174. Thus, it can be concluded that the prohibition on 
refoulement in the context of ECHR is indeed of absolute nature. 
 
2.4 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
2.4.1 General introduction to the United Nations Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (later referred to as CAT) was adopted by the United 
Nations on 1984 and came into force on 1987. Currently there are 159 States 
Parties to CAT.175 According to the preamble of CAT its aim is to strengthen the 
struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment throughout the world. The term “strengthen” clearly indicates that 
torture is already outlawed and fought against in international law but not 
sufficiently176. CAT consists of three parts and 33 articles, of which articles 1 – 
16 contain a definition of torture and obligations for States parties. The second 
part (articles 17 – 24) concerns rules regarding implementation of the 
Convention and its supervisory mechanism while the final part (articles 25 – 
33) consists of final treaty clauses. Like the Refugee Convention and ECHR, 
                                                                                                                                  
where the dissenting judges argued in favor of a proportionality test in refoulement 
situations. 
173 Saadi v. Italy, paragraphs 120 and 122 – 123. 
174 Saadi v. Italy, paragraphs 137 – 147.  
175 United Nations: Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Convention 9, status as of 24.5.2016. See 
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
9&chapter=4&lang=en>. Accessed on 24.5.2016. 
176 See for instance UNDHR article 5: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”. 
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CAT is a human rights treaty that formulates obligations for States parties to it, 
and those obligations can be seen as the rights of an individual177. CAT is a 
universal treaty that is not regionally limited. 
 
Article 17 of CAT establishes a supervisory body named Committee against 
Torture (later referred to as ComAT). It consists of ten members who are each 
elected by the States parties. ComAT should not be seen as an appellate, a 
quasi-judicial or an administrative body but as a monitoring body with 
declaratory powers only178. It has various monitoring mechanisms, of which 
one is mandatory to States parties and the others optional. The only mandatory 
mechanism is the country reports, which means that States are obliged to 
submit to ComAT country reports every four years. Optional mechanisms 
include an inquiry mechanism, a State-complaint mechanism and an individual 
complaint mechanism. The individual complaint mechanism has significant 
value when interpreting CAT since it has been used very actively resulting in 
many Communications by ComAT179. In addition, ComAT has issued a rather 
large number of other documents such as Concluding Observations on country 
reports, Annual Reports and General Comments, which are of interpretative 
relevance. These other documents alongside the case law of ComAT forms the 
basis of the interpretation of CAT. 
 
When interpreting CAT one should keep in mind the general principles of 
interpreting human rights treaties, as discussed previously in this thesis. Like 
ECHR, CAT should be interpreted in an evolutive way, and the rights 
guaranteed by it should be interpreted liberally whereas restrictions narrowly. 
Of importance are also other human rights treaties covering the same subject 
area as that of CAT. However, it has been argued that ComAT itself has not 
                                                 
177 Wouters 2009, p. 427. 
178 Committee Against Torture 1997, paragraph 9. 
179 As of 15.8.2015 there have been 539 concluded cases by ComAT of which 272 cases were 
declared admissible. See UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner: Statistical 
Survey on individual complaints 2015. 
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been very active in referring to the general rules of treaty interpretation or other 
human rights treaties covering the same subject area180. A clearer picture of the 
content and elements of CAT will be presented next through the analysis of the 
principle of non-refoulement in this specific context. 
 
 
2.4.2 The principle of non-refoulement in the United Nations 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
2.4.2.1 An overview of the principle of non-refoulement 
The prohibition on refoulement is formulated explicitly in article 3 of CAT, 
which in its first paragraph States “No State Party shall expel, return 
("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”. 
The second paragraph of article 3 guides the evidentiary assessment of the 
danger proscribed by the first paragraph and it emphasizes the importance of 
the human rights situation of a destination State. Article 3 (2) of CAT states 
“For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent 
authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where 
applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, 
flagrant or mass violations of human rights.”. Article 16 of CAT prohibits 
“…other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which 
do not amount to torture as defined in Article 1…” but, unlike article 3, it does 
not explicitly mention a prohibition of refoulement. It would seem then that 
only article 3 is relevant for the principle of non-refoulement in the context of 
CAT. Indeed, this has been confirmed by the ComAT: “…the scope of the non-
refoulement obligation described in article 3 does not extend to situations of ill-
treatment envisaged by article 16.”181. Thus, when analyzing the prohibition on 
                                                 
180 Wouters 2009, p. 434. 
181 T.M. v. Sweden CAT/C/31/D/228/2003, UN Committee Against Torture, 2003, paragraph 6.2. 
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refoulement in the context of CAT in this thesis the focus is purely on article 3. 
 
The principle of non-refoulement in the context of CAT has some interesting 
connections to the previously addressed Convention regimes, the Refugee 
Convention and ECHR, which are worthy to mention here. Firstly, the explicit 
formulation of the prohibition on refoulement in CAT was largely influenced by 
case law that was emerging under the European Commission on Human Rights. 
This concerned both cases of expulsion and of extradition. Secondly, the exact 
wording of article 3 of CAT bears great resemblance to article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention, especially the terms “return” and “refouler”. Indeed, the 
addition of these words seems to play a similar role as in article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention, broadening the protection on the basis of humanitarian 
reasons.182 Despite the clear connection of CAT to both the Refugee Convention 
and ECHR it is next necessary to focus purely on the interpretation of the 
principle of non-refoulement in the context of CAT since it is a separate regime 
with its own distinct characteristics. 
 
Once again, it is useful to separate the content of the prohibition on refoulement 
into different elements. I will firstly go through the personal and territorial 
scope of the principle. After that it will be investigated what kind of harm is it 
that CAT article 3 protects people from. Then the element of risk will be 
analyzed, and finally some concluding remarks will be drawn regarding the 
character of the principle of non-refoulement in the context of CAT. 
 
2.4.2.2 Personal and (extra-) territorial scope 
The protection from refoulement afforded by article 3 of CAT is very broad in 
its personal scope. This interpretation is based on the wording of that article 
since it prohibits the refoulement of “a person”. There are no mentions of 
                                                 
182 Burgers and Danelius 1988, p. 35 and 50. 
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restricting factors such as a person’s nationality, legal status and location. 
Neither are Stateless persons or aliens who are illegally in the area of a country 
excluded from protection. Thus, it can be concluded that the personal scope of 
the protection from refoulement that article 3 affords is limitless as long as the 
object of that protection is a person, i.e. a human being. 
 
The territorial scope of article 3 of CAT is not explicitly formulated anywhere 
in the text of the Convention. Only article 2 refers to the general responsibility 
of State Parties by stating that they must “prevent acts of torture in any territory 
under its jurisdiction”. This formulation can at first be seen as limiting the 
responsibility of State Parties territorially, but this interpretation would seem 
misguided since ComAT itself has commented that article 2 of CAT does not 
limit a State Party’s responsibility in the context of refoulement183. Since, as 
previously established, the text of article 3 of CAT is heavily influenced by the 
Refugee Convention, it has been argued that an analogical interpretation of the 
territorial scope clarifies the issue. As previously mentioned in chapter 2.2.2.2, 
the principle of non-refoulement applies both territorially and extra-territorially 
in the context of the Refugee Convention. Thus, by analogy the same applies to 
the interpretation of article 3 of CAT. In addition, according to general 
international human rights law a State has a responsibility regarding a person’s 
human rights if: a) that person is present within the territory of a State; b) a 
State has actual control or authority over that person; or c) a State exercises 
effective control over foreign territory where that person is.184 The comment 
made by ComAT, the analogous interpretation and the guidelines that general 
human rights law provide, which all seem persuasive and convincing, argue for 
the extra-territorial responsibility of States regarding the prohibition of 
refoulement in the context of CAT. Thus, it can be concluded that the territorial 
                                                 
183 Committee Against Torture 2008, paragraph 19. It has been argued that this is because the 
prohibition on refoulement does not concern situations where acts of torture are committed 
by or occur in the territory of a State party but instead situations where a State party has 
expelled or returned an individual to another State, regardless of what is the territorial status 
of the destination State. See Wouters 2009, p. 438. 
184 Wouters 2009, p. 435 – 438. 
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scope of article 3 is both territorial and extra-territorial. 
 
2.4.2.3 The harm from which a person is protected 
It becomes clear from the wording of article 3 that CAT provides protection 
only from torture. Thus, to answer the question what is the harm that the 
principle of non-refoulement protects one from in the context of CAT it is 
necessary to seek out what kind of conduct qualifies as torture. Fortunately, 
CAT has a rather comprehensive definition of torture in its article 1, which is 
directly linked to the interpretation of article 3 that prohibits refoulement185. 
Article 1 of CAT States “For the purposes of this Convention, the term 
“torture” means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining 
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an 
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or  suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.”. Since the 
definition of torture in article 1 is so long it can be divided into different 
elements such as result and purpose of the conduct, intention and identity of the 
perpetrator and the exclusion of lawful sanctions. It is necessary to next address 
these different elements separately. 
 
Torture is defined as an “act” but it would seem justified that it encompasses 
also omissions in special circumstances186. The result of an act or omission has 
                                                 
185 This has been stated many times by ComAT in its case law, see for instance G.R.B. v. Sweden 
CAT/C/20/D/083/1997, UN Committee Against Torture, 1998, paragraph 6.5 and S.S. v. The 
Netherlands CAT/C/30/D/191/2001, UN Committee Against Torture, 2003, paragraph 6.4. 
The latter case is later referred to as “S.S. v. The Netherlands”. 
186 The inclusion of omissions would, in accordance with article 31 of VCLT, follow the object 
and purpose of the Convention, which is to strengthen the struggle against torture. It has 
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to be severe physical or mental pain or suffering, but it is very difficult to assess 
what is the minimum level of severity required. It can be, however, be deduced 
that a risk of “double jeopardy” where a person would be arrested and retried in 
the country of destination does not qualify as torture187, and neither does the 
absence of adequate psychiatric treatment in the country of destination188. 
Whereas, for instance, according to ComAT following practices constitute 
torture: threat of being drowned, mock executions, electric shocks, pouring 
water that contains irritants into the mouth while pressure is applied to the 
victim’s stomach and repeated blows to various parts of body189. Thus, it can be 
concluded that torture includes acts that are done repeatedly or in connection 
with other acts, even if those acts alone or done once would not suffice, as well 
as an act that has occurred only once so long as it is severe enough. 
 
Severe pain or suffering must be intentionally inflicted for a specific purpose 
for a conduct to qualify as torture. Since the perpetrator of torture needs to 
intend the harm caused merely negligent conduct does not suffice. The intention 
required includes both a general intent regarding an act’s result of severe pain 
or suffering to the victim and a specific intent concerning the purpose of such 
an act. This means that it is not required that the objective of the perpetrator is 
the infliction of severe pain or suffering so long as the perpetrator intended to 
act for a prohibited purpose.190 According to article 1 of CAT prohibited 
purposes include obtaining information from the victim or from a third person, 
punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or the third person, or any 
discriminatory reason. Although the term “such as” used in the text of article 1 
implies that the list of prohibited purposes is only illustrative and not 
exhaustive it has been argued that other relevant purposes must have something 
                                                                                                                                  
been argued that omissions such as the deprivation of food and other vital items can 
constitute torture, see UN Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture 2011, p. 3.  
187 P.Q.L. V. Canada CAT/C/19/D/57/1996, UN Committee Against Torture, 1997, paragraph 
10.5. 
188 K.K. v. Switzerland CAT/C/31/D/186/2001, UN Committee Against Torture, 2003, paragraph 
6.8. 
189 Committee Against Torture 2003, paragraphs 143 – 144. 
190 Hathaway, Nowlan and Spiegel 2012, p. 799 – 801. 
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in common with the listed purposes191. The primary objective of CAT is to 
eliminate torture that public officials are responsible for when the purpose of 
their acts is connected to their public functions. Because of this it would seem 
reasonable to require from prohibited purposes not listed in article 1 at least a 
remote connection to the interests or policies of the State and its organs192. It is 
important to note that the element of intent and purpose should not be 
established based on evidence of subjective motives of the perpetrators but 
instead on the basis of objective assessment of the situation193. 
 
According to article 1 of CAT torture has to be inflicted, instigated, consented 
or acquiesced by a public official or another person acting in an official 
capacity. It has been argued that this requirement of some kind of State 
involvement in the harm inflicted stems from the assumption that violence done 
by private actors would normally be addressed by a State’s domestic legal 
system regardless of international prohibitions on torture, unlike violence that 
public officials are responsible for194. The clearest situation is when a public 
official is the one who has inflicted torture, in other words, directly acted as a 
perpetrator195. Instigation means bringing something about, initiating something 
or inciting someone to do something196. Instigating is considered as including 
both a direct and an indirect involvement of a public official, such as when a 
State uses private groups such as paramilitary forces that participate in acts 
constituting torture197. Arguably consent is only indirect involvement where a 
public official clearly, actively and knowingly accepts acts of torture. The most 
difficult level of involvement to assess is acquiescence. The ordinary meaning 
of the word “acquiescence” is accepting something reluctantly without 
                                                 
191 Miller 2005, p. 16. 
192 Burgers and Danelius 1988, p.  118 – 119. 
193 Committee Against Torture 2008, paragraph 9. 
194 Burgers and Danelius 1988, p. 119 – 120. 
195 Wouters 2009, p. 446. 
196 <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/instigate>. Accessed on 1.6.2016. 
197 Wouters 2009, p. 446. 
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protesting198. The ordinary meaning of the word seems not to suffice in this 
context since it has been argued that a State is acquiescing when it knows, could 
have known or ought to have known an act of torture was about to be 
committed or has been committed by private perpetrators and that State does 
not act to the fullest extent of its capabilities in taking effective legislative, 
administrative, judicial or other measures in response199. For instance, the 
failure of public officials in intervening in customs such as sexual mutilations 
can be considered as acquiescence200. ComAT has considered acquiescence in a 
case that, although concerning the application of article 16 instead of article 3, 
is relevant in this context too. In it ComAT found that a State acquiesced in 
prohibited ill-treatment when police, informed of the immediate risk of ill-
treatment and present when it occurred, failed to take appropriate steps in 
protecting the victims and in addition, failed to conduct a proper investigation 
after the incident201. It has been considered that a State is responsible also when 
it is not unwilling but unable to provide effective protection against torture by 
private actors202. This responsibility should, however, only activate when the 
private actors who are the perpetrators of torture occupy and exercise quasi-
governmental authority over the area where that kind of ill-treatment occurs203. 
 
According to article 1 of CAT torture “does not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions”. It is not 
completely clear whether these sanctions have to be lawful in the context of 
national law only or also in international humanitarian law204. It would seem 
however that establishing lawful sanctions in such a way that they would defeat 
                                                 
198 <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/acquiescence>. Accessed on 
1.6.2016.  
199 Wouters 2009, p. 446 – 447. Article 2 of CAT obliges States parties to take effective 
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture. 
200 UN doc. E/CN.4/1986/15, paragraph 38. 
201 Hajrizi Dzemajl et al. v. Yugoslavia CAT/C/29/D/161/2000, UN Committee Against Torture, 
2002, paragraphs 9.2 and 9.4. 
202 UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2002, p. 34. 
203 S.S. v. Netherlands, paragraph 6.4. 
204 Burgers and Danelius 1988, p. 47. 
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the object and purpose of CAT cannot be allowed205. ComAT has itself 
emphasized that any effort by a State to justify torture as a means to protect 
safety or avert emergencies is absolutely rejected in all situations206. In case law 
concerning article 3 (prohibition of refoulement) it seems that whether an act 
amounting to torture is a lawful sanction or not has not been relevant for the 
outcome207. Indeed, it has been argued that it is quite impossible to find a 
meaningful way to apply the lawful sanctions exclusion clause and thus it 
should be ignored208. I agree with this proposal since it does not seem justified 
to apply this exception when at the same time CAT clearly and absolutely 
prohibits torture. Moreover, according to the preamble of CAT it aims at 
strengthening the protection against torture and allowing States to legalize acts 
amounting to torture would lead in exactly the opposite result and would thus 
be against the object and purpose of the whole Convention.  
 
It is evident that a major gap in refugee protection regarding this treaty regime 
is the scope of the harm from which a person is protected. Not only does the ill-
treatment need to be very severe it must also be intentionally inflicted for a 
specific purpose for it to qualify as torture. In addition, the prohibited purpose 
not listed in article 1 must have at least a remote connection to the interests or 
policies of the State and its organs and the conduct itself must be inflicted, 
instigated, consented or acquiesced by a public official or another person acting 
in an official capacity. Thus, a refugee is not protected in many situations where 
he would clearly have a substantial risk of ill-treatment. This could happen for 
                                                 
205 See for instance the reservation made by United States, which States: “That with reference to 
article 1 of the Convention, the United States understands that `sanctions' includes 
judicially-imposed sanctions and other enforcement actions authorized by United States law 
or by judicial interpretation of such law. Nonetheless, the United States understands that a 
State Party could not through its domestic sanctions defeat the object and purpose of the 
Convention to prohibit torture.”. 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
9&chapter=4&lang=en>. Accessed on 13.6.2016. 
206 Committee Against Torture 2008, paragraph 5. 
207 For instance, A.S. v. Sweden CAT/C/25/D/149/1999, UN Committee Against Torture, 2001, 
paragraphs 8.4 – 9. This case is later referred to as “A.S. v. Sweden”. Stoning to death was a 
lawful sanction under Iranian national law. 
208 Nowak and McArthur 2008, p. 84. 
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instance, if the level of severity of the ill-treatment is not high enough, if very 
severe treatment is inflicted but not for a specific purpose or if the 
responsibility of the prohibited conduct itself cannot be connected even by 
acquiescence to a public official or to another person acting in an official 
capacity. 
 
2.4.2.4 The element of risk 
Article 3 (1) of CAT prohibits refoulement “where there are substantial grounds 
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”. The 
word “danger” implies that a mere possibility is not sufficient but on the other 
hand full certainty is not required either, and thus there clearly is an element of 
risk. The assessment of the risk must be done ex nunc, in other words, in the 
moment of the consideration of the complaint unless removal has already taken 
place, in which case the assessment must be done based on the moment of 
removal209. On the evidentiary side “substantial grounds” is required and article 
3 (2) of CAT emphasizes the importance of “a consistent pattern of gross, 
flagrant or mass violations of human rights” in the destination State in 
“determining whether there are such grounds”. The element of risk has been 
described as the “backbone of the prohibition on refoulement” in article 3 of 
CAT210. It is necessary next to scrutinize this risk assessment in several parts.  
First I will analyze the substantive side of the element of risk, which concerns 
the level of probability required for establishing whether there is a danger of 
being subjected torture. Secondly the evidentiary side will be discussed, 
including the standard of evidence, credibility and burden of proof relevant for 
determining whether substantial grounds have been shown. Lastly I will go 
through the issue of national protection, including internal protection alternative 
                                                 
209 For assessment in the moment of the consideration of the complaint see case Hanan Ahmed 
Fouad Abd El Khalek Attia v. Sweden CAT/C/31/D/199/2002, UN Committee Against 
Torture, 2003, paragraph 12.1. This case is later referred to as “Attia v. Sweden”. For 
assessment in the moment of the removal see case Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. 
Sweden CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, UN Committee Against Torture, 2005, paragraph 13.2. This 
case is later referred to as “Agiza v. Sweden”. 
210 Wouters 2009, p. 458. 
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and diplomatic assurances. 
 
The element of risk has been seen as a purely objective element211, and indeed 
in my opinion it would seem counterintuitive even terminologically to assume 
that “danger” would require a subjective feeling of fear. The risk or “danger” 
needs, however, to be personal, foreseeable, real and present212. High 
probability is not required but the risk must go beyond mere theory or suspicion 
for it to be foreseeable213. For a risk to be personal it must be established that an 
individual is personally at risk214 even though it can also be possible, albeit rare, 
for a risk to be established solely on the membership of a specific group that 
runs a substantial risk of torture215. For the danger to be “real” a sufficient 
combination of personal facts and circumstances must be presented, possibly 
with the addition of evidence regarding the general human rights violations in 
the country of destination, which does not, however, suffice on its own216. It has 
been emphasized that the general human rights violations are relevant only 
when the violations have been performed, instigated, consented, acquiesced by 
a public official or other person acting in an official capacity217. Relevant 
evidence for establishing the general human rights situation include practices of 
torture and other inhuman treatment as well as practices that can facilitate acts 
                                                 
211 Wouters 2009, p. 459. 
212 Seid Mortesa Aemei v. Switzerland CAT/C/18/D/34/1995, UN Committee Against Torture, 
1997, paragraph 9.5. This case is later referred to as “Aemei v. Switzerland”. Chedli Ben 
Ahmed Karoui v. Sweden CAT/C/28/D/185/2001, UN Committee Against Torture, 2002, 
paragraph 8. This case is later referred to as “Karoui v. Sweden”. For instance, these cases 
mentioned the terms “personal”, “foreseeable” and “real”. See also Gamal El Rgeig v. 
Switzerland CAT/C/37/D/280/2005, UN Committee Against Torture, 2007, paragraph 7.3, 
where the term “present” is mentioned. This case is later referred to as “El Rgeig v. 
Switzerland”. 
213 Committee Against Torture 1997, paragraph 6. Regarding case law see for instance E.A. v. 
Switzerland CAT/C/19/D/028/1995, UN Committee Against Torture, 1997, paragraph 11.3. 
214 Balabou Mutombo v. Switzerland CAT/C/12/D/013/1993, UN Committee Against 
Torture, 1994, paragraph 9.3. This case is later referred to as “Mutombo v. Switzerland”. 
215 S.S. and S.A. v. Netherlands CAT/C/26/D/142/1999, UN Committee Against Torture, 2001, 
paragraph 6.6. Even though the Committee concluded that in this case a mere belonging to a 
group did not suffice, it can be seen as leaving the possibility of that open. See also Wouters 
2009, p. 461. 
216 Mutombo v. Switzerland, paragraph 9.3. 
217 Committee Against Torture 1997, paragraph 3. Naturally this stems from the definition of 
torture in article 1 of CAT, see chapter 2.4.2.3. 
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of torture or increase the risk of them218. To establish that the individual is 
vulnerable to torture upon his return the individual’s past experiences of human 
rights violations and political activities have been seen as particularly important 
evidence219. Also relevant is the length of time that has passed since the 
individual’s aforementioned experiences since for instance six years ago has not 
been considered to be recent enough while four years has220. Finally, it would 
seem that it is not relevant whether the risk stems from the experiences of the 
individual before or after his departure from his country of origin and thus, 
similar to the Refugee Convention and ECHR, risk sur place is protected by 
CAT221. 
 
The claim for protection afforded by article 3 of CAT must be sufficiently 
detailed, comprehensive, consistent and plausible considering the general 
human rights situation in the country of origin222. Regarding inconsistencies, it 
must, however, be noted that complete accuracy should not be required from 
victims of torture and if the inconsistencies are not material and do not raise 
doubts about the general veracity of the author's claims they are not crucial for 
the claim223.  It has been also argued that it is relevant what moment in time the 
facts and evidence are presented as well as the truthfulness of the facts224. It is 
sufficient that the facts presented by the individual are found well attested and 
                                                 
218 Mutombo v. Switzerland, paragraph 9.5. 
219 Ibid., paragraph 8. 
220 See cases where six years was not recent enough: S.S.S. v. 
Canada CAT/C/35/D/245/2004, UN Committee Against Torture, 2005, paragraph 8.4 and N. 
Z. S. v. Sweden CAT/C/37/D/277/2005, UN Committee Against Torture, 2006, paragraph 
8.5. The latter case is later referred to as “N.Z.S. v. Sweden”. A case where four years was 
recent enough: Tahir Hussain Khan v. Canada CAT/C/13/D/15/1994, UN Committee 
Against Torture, 18 November 1994, paragraph 12.6. This case is later referred to as “Khan 
v. Canada”. 
221 Aemei v. Switzerland, paragraph 9.5.  
222 See A.S. v. Sweden, paragraph 8.6, where sufficient details and plausibility were mentioned. 
See also Karoui v. Sweden, paragraph 10, where consistency and comprehensiveness were 
discussed. 
223 For instance, Mrs. Pauline Muzonzo Paku Kisoki v. Sweden CAT/C/16/D/41/1996, UN 
Committee Against Torture, 1996, paragraph 9.3. This case is later referred to as “Kisoki v. 
Sweden”. 
224 Wouters 2009, p. 477. 
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credible, and thus not all the facts must be proved225. Important evidence 
relating to the individual’s experiences includes letters of support from non-
governmental organizations and, perhaps most importantly, medical reports226. 
Evidence that relates instead to the general human rights situation in the 
country of origin includes information resulting from the mechanisms of the 
ComAT itself227, information resulting from UNHCR228 and findings made by 
national authorities229, such as diplomatic missions in the country of origin of 
the individual claiming for protection. 
 
The burden of proof is primarily on the individual claiming for protection since 
the complainant has to submit sufficient details and evidence in support of his 
claim230. However, the State party is obliged to assess whether substantial 
grounds exist for the claimant’s claim, and when sufficient details and evidence 
have been presented by the individual the burden of proof can be shifted to the 
State party231. It has been argued that the responsibility of the State party is 
emphasized by the phrasing of the first paragraph of article 3 since substantial 
grounds need to exist, not to be shown. It has also been proposed that the 
second paragraph of article 3 as well as the case law of the ComAT highlight 
the active role of a State party since they oblige the competent authorities to 
take into account all relevant considerations and to ensure the security of the 
                                                 
225 H.D. v. Switzerland CAT/C/22/D/112/1998, UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), 1999, 
paragraph 6.4. 
226 For instance, Karoui v. Sweden, paragraph 10. 
227 For instance, see cases U.S. v. Finland CAT/C/30/D/197/2002, UN Committee Against 
Torture, 15 May 2003, paragraph 7.7, where the inquiry mechanism according to article 20 
of CAT was utilized; Cecilia Rosana Núñez Chipana v. 
Venezuela CAT/C/21/D/110/1998, UN Committee Against Torture, 1998, paragraph 6.4, 
where the reporting mechanism according to article 19 of CAT was utilized. 
228 Kisoki v. Sweden, paragraph 9.5. 
229 Committee Against Torture 1997, paragraph 9 (a) States that “Considerable weight will be 
given…to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned.”. See also, 
for instance, N.Z.S. v. Sweden, paragraph 8.6. 
230 Committee Against Torture 1997, paragraph 5. See also, for instance, S.P.A. v. 
Canada CAT/C/37/D/282/2005, UN Committee Against Torture, 2006, paragraph 7.5. 
231 Committee Against Torture 1997, paragraph 6. See, for instance, A.S. v. Sweden, paragraph 
8.6, where indeed “…the author has submitted sufficient details… to shift the burden of 
proof.”. 
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individual.232 Indeed, it would seem justified to conclude that in a way the 
individual and the State party share the burden of proof, although naturally at 
first the individual must be more active in presenting sufficient facts and 
evidence to make his claim comprehensive, consistent and plausible. 
 
Finally, the element of risk can be influenced by the issue of national 
protection, including internal protection alternative and diplomatic assurances. 
Internal protection alternative can eliminate or considerably alleviate the risk of 
torture usually in a situation where the public authorities of a State control only 
a part of the territory of that State. It has been argued that it is difficult to 
deduce from the case law of ComAT the requirements for an internal protection 
alternative, other than, rather obviously, that it needs to be safe233. Indeed, 
regarding internal protection alternative it would seem that I can only conclude 
that in some cases the argument for internal protection alternative has been 
accepted234 and in some cases rejected235. Diplomatic assurances aim to 
guarantee the individual’s safety by guarantees made by the State authorities of 
the country of destination. ComAT has been satisfied with diplomatic 
assurances when they provide a sufficient mechanism for their enforcement and 
when the State issuing the assurances is a State party to CAT236. However, it has 
been argued that in general the Committee is rather reluctant to accept 
diplomatic assurances237. Indeed, it has been recommended that States parties 
should rely on diplomatic assurances only when the assuring State is not 
                                                 
232 Wouters 2009, p. 485 – 486. 
233 Wouters 2009, p. 495. 
234 For instance, B.S.S. v. Canada CAT/C/32/D/183/2001, UN Committee Against 
Torture, 2004, paragraph 11.5, where the Committee Stated that “…the complainant has 
failed to substantiate that he would be unable to lead a life free of torture in another part of 
India.”. 
235 For instance, Halil Hayden v. Sweden CAT/C/21/D/101/1997, UN Committee Against 
Torture, 1998, paragraph 6.4, where the Committee Stated that “…no place of refuge is 
available within the country…”. 
236 Attia v. Sweden, paragraph 12.3 and Agiza v. Sweden, paragraph 13.4. It is important to note 
that different conclusions were drawn regarding the aforementioned two cases despite the 
destination State being Egypt in both cases, the former satisfying the requirements of the 
Committee and the latter not. 
237 Wouters 2009, p. 499. 
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systematically violating CAT’s provisions and only when there exist clear 
procedures for obtaining such assurances as well as arrangements for effective 
post-return monitoring238. I concur with this recommendation, especially when 
CAT protects individuals only from torture that is connected in some way to 
State authorities. In my opinion this means that particular caution must be 
exercised when considering the reliability of assurances made by State 
authorities. 
 
2.4.2.5 The character of the principle of non-refoulement 
The prohibition on refoulement is formulated in absolute terms in article 3 of 
CAT. The absolute character is further strengthened in at least three ways. 
Firstly, case law of ComAT has consistently found that no exceptions regarding 
article 3 are permitted, not even when an individual poses a threat to the 
national security of a State or has otherwise engaged in illegal activities, such as 
being convicted of assault239. Secondly, article 2 (2) and 2 (3) of CAT explicitly 
prohibit torture even because of exceptional circumstances such as a state of 
war or because of an order from a superior officer or a public authority. Thirdly, 
ComAT has explicitly discussed this issue in its General Comment Number 2, 
where it expressed its serious concern at States’ efforts to justify torture or to 
grant any kind of amnesty to the perpetrators of it and emphasized the absolute 
nature of the prohibition on refoulement in the context of CAT240. Although it 
would at first glance seem that the exclusion of lawful sanctions in the 
definition of torture in article 1 of CAT would make prohibition on refoulement 
                                                 
238 Nowak and McArthur 2008, p. 150. 
239 See, for instance, following cases: Gorki Ernesto Tapia Paez v. Sweden 
CAT/C/18/D/39/1996, UN Committee Against Torture, 1997, paragraph 14.5, and Adel 
Tebourski v. France CAT/C/38/D/300/2006, UN Committee Against Torture, 2007, 
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Against Torture, 2005, paragraph 4.4, where the State party explained that “the risk that the 
complainant represented to Canadian society outweighed any risk that he might face upon 
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240 Committee Against Torture 2008, paragraph 5. 
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derogable in that context, it seems justified to simply ignore that exclusion 
since it hasn’t proven out to be practically viable, as discussed previously in 
chapter 2.4.2.3. No doubt the State parties will continue to try and challenge the 
definition of torture as well as the absolute character of the principle of non-
refoulement, especially based on threats from international terrorism241. 
However, ComAT consistently maintains that the character of the prohibition of 
torture and thus of the principle of non-refoulement in the context of CAT 
remains absolute no matter how severe threats of terrorisms the State party 
encounters242. Thus, it can be concluded that the prohibition on refoulement is 
indeed absolute in the context of CAT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
241 See, for instance, ComAT 2014, paragraph 9, where ComAT expressed concern because 
USA maintains its restrictive definition of torture. 
242 For instance, ComAT 2016, paragraph 12. 
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3. Comparison of three human rights treaty regimes 
regarding the principle of non-refoulement 
I will next compare the content of the principle of non-refoulement in the three 
human rights treaty regimes discussed in chapter 2, those being the Refugee 
Convention, ECHR and CAT. When introducing the prohibition of refoulement 
in each one of the treaty regimes I have analyzed separately the scope and the 
character of the principle, the harm from which it protects a person from and 
the element of risk that it includes. I maintain this division in this comparative 
chapter as well, with the addition of first discussing the supervisory 
mechanisms of the three regimes, after which the scope of the principle of non-
refoulement will be compared. Following the scope, the harm from which a 
person is protected will be analyzed. After that I will discuss how the element 
of risk compares between the treaty regimes. Finally, the character of the 
principle of non-refoulement will be comparatively scrutinized. 
3.1 The supervisory mechanisms regarding the 
prohibition on refoulement 
It has become clear from the previous chapters that ECHR and CAT regimes 
both have important and effective supervisory mechanisms, those being ECtHR 
and ComAT. They have proven out to clarify the content of the prohibition on 
refoulement in their own contexts by providing substantial case law. Refugee 
Convention regime differs greatly from the other two in this regard since it does 
not contain any proper supervisory mechanism that has been used up to this 
day. Even though article 38 of the Refugee Convention enables States to make 
complaints to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in order to decide 
bindingly on the interpretation of that convention that possibility has 
unfortunately never been utilized. On the other hand, UNHCR has a duty, 
according to article 35 (1) of the Refugee Convention, to supervise the 
application of the Refugee Convention, but it is left largely without any 
effective means to perform that supervision. UNCHR and EXCOM have, 
however, issued several interpretative guidelines that clarify the content of the 
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prohibition on refoulement and that have been accepted by States on an 
international level. Whereas, according to articles 19, 34 and 46 of ECHR, 
ECtHR is a permanent judicial body that makes binding decisions. In the 
context of CAT, according to article 17 and 22, ComAT is established as the 
supervisory body and it too can review individual complaints but does not, 
however, have the competence to deliver binding decisions243. Thus, although 
both ECHR and CAT, unlike Refugee Convention, share a supervisory body 
that is capable of making decisions on individual complaints and that is used 
frequently, they differ on the nature of the decisions made. ECtHR makes 
binding judgments while the decisions of ComAT are of a declaratory nature. 
The judgments of ECtHR have also proven out to be, in most cases, more 
extensively argued than those of ComAT. ECtHR can also be considered to 
resemble more a de facto appellate judicial body, meaning that it conducts a 
more rigorous re-assessment of the facts. 
 
ECHR has the strongest mechanism since it can make binding judgments on 
individual complaints, it has a great amount of case law that is often well-
argued, it is directly relevant for individual human rights protection and it often 
acts as a de facto appellate judicial body. CAT is similar to ECHR since it also 
processes individual complaints and is also directly relevant for individual 
human rights protection. It is, however, considerably weaker than ECHR since 
its case law is not binding and not as developed in its amount or its 
argumentation and it often plays a more passive role in the re-assessment of 
facts. CAT contains also, unlike ECHR, a State reporting mechanism and a 
possibility for ComAT to adopt general views on the interpretation of CAT, and 
although these mechanisms are not binding either they can be considered as 
bringing a little extra strength into the supervisory mechanism of CAT. The 
weakest of the three convention regimes is without a doubt the Refugee 
Convention since it does not process individual complaints, its State complaint 
                                                 
243 Rather the decisions are of a declaratory nature, see Committee Against Torture 1997, 
paragraph 9. 
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system has never been used and the supervisory mechanisms under UNHCR 
can be considered very weak. Despite the clear weakness of the Refugee 
Convention it should be noted that the guidelines that UNHCR and EXCOM 
provide have been accepted globally by States, and thus have proven out to be 
of interpretative relevance. Still, real authority in interpreting the Refugee 
Convention seems to lie at the national level.244 
 
3.2 Scope  
The personal scope of ECHR and CAT is clearly without restrictions since they 
apply to everyone regardless of their nationality or legal status within the 
jurisdiction of the States party to it. The Refugee Convention clearly differs 
from the two aforementioned conventions since its protection is limited only to 
refugees or refugee claimants as defined by article 1 of the Refugee 
Convention. The Refugee Convention limits the personal scope of the 
prohibition on refoulement in five ways: a person must be outside his country 
of origin, that person must base his fear of persecution on discriminatory 
reasons and be unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of his 
country of origin. In addition, the cessation and exclusion clauses in articles 1C, 
1D, 1E and 1F provide conditions that exclude a person from the protection 
from refoulement (and from the protection of the Refugee Convention in its 
entirety). Thus, it can be concluded that the personal scope is most limited in 
the Refugee Convention and identical in ECHR and CAT. 
 
All three treaties apply within the territory of their States parties. The term 
“territory” must be understood broadly as the treaties apply also to persons in 
the transit zones of States’ airports or to stowaways in States’ seaports. 
Regarding the extra-territorial scope ECHR has the clearest rules as its article 1 
states that States “…shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights 
and freedoms…”. This means that ECHR is applied to a State party even 
                                                 
244 Wouters 2009, p. 528 – 530. Pirjola 2002, p. 756. 
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outside its own territory when it exercises effective control over a foreign 
territory or when a conduct can otherwise be attributed to that State party. 
Although CAT and the Refugee Convention do not explicitly mention their 
extra-territorial application, there have been strong interpretative arguments that 
point towards their extra-territorial scope, most notably the interpretation of the 
word “refouler” and the use of that term in both treaties. Thus, I would argue 
that all three treaties have extra-territorial scope. A notable exception is that the 
Refugee Convention does not apply in the country of origin of the person 
seeking for protection, as article 1 and 33 together clearly state that protection 
is afforded only to refugees, who by definition must be outside their countries 
of nationalities. Therefore, ECHR and CAT have broader territorial scope than 
the Refugee Convention. 
 
3.3 The harm from which a person is protected 
It has been argued that generally the principle of non-refoulement protects a 
person from human rights violations that are of a serious nature245. This can be 
seen most clearly in ECHR and CAT since the former protects a person from 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (article 3 of ECHR) 
and the latter protects a person only from torture (article 3 of CAT). It can be 
immediately noticed that ECHR offers a wider protection than CAT because it 
includes other kind of harm than torture. The Refugee Convention is much 
more ambiguous in this respect since it protects a person from discriminatory 
persecution. Although persecution is not defined in the Refugee Convention it 
has been argued, as previously discussed in chapter 2.2.2.3, that it too signifies 
a human rights violation that causes serious harm. Thus, all three treaties can be 
seen as protecting a person from a distinct yet a similar kind of harm. It is 
necessary next to examine the differences and the similarities of the harm from 
which these three treaties protect a person from in more depth. I will firstly 
discuss torture since both ECHR and CAT protect a person from it. After that 
                                                 
245 Wouters 2009, p. 533. 
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persecution will be compared to both torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Lastly the question of whether the source of the harm 
is relevant or irrelevant in each treaty will be analyzed. 
 
CAT and ECHR both protect a person from being subjected to torture but only 
CAT has a definition of it in its text. Torture in the context of ECHR can be, 
however, defined through its extensive case law. In both treaties torture has to 
have a certain level of severity in its effects on the victim as article 1 of CAT 
speaks of severe physical or mental pain or suffering while case law of ECtHR 
almost identically mentions particularly serious, cruel and severe physical or 
mental pain or suffering246. Also similar to both treaties, torture has to be 
intentionally inflicted and for a certain purpose. This becomes clear from the 
wording of article 1 of CAT, but the case law of ECtHR seems to leave open the 
possibility that intent is not decisive when the ill-treatment is severe enough247. 
It has been argued that the purpose element should be interpreted broadly, 
although CAT requires additionally at least some kind of a connection with the 
interests of a State. This is logical since CAT defines torture as including some 
form of official State involvement.248 Torture in the context of ECHR instead is 
not restricted to only situations where State is involved. Although the scope of 
torture differs between these two treaty regimes, they can be also described as 
having a close and linked relationship. Most notably ECtHR has referred to 
CAT (or to its predecessor) several times in its extensive case law to clarify the 
issue of what amounts to torture249. However, ECtHR and ComAT have differed 
                                                 
246 Selmouni v. France, paragraph 105. 
247 For instance, Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, paragraph 440, where the element of 
intent was of no consideration. Exceptionally harsh treatment had been experienced by the 
applicant: “…death   sentence   imposed   on   the applicant coupled with the conditions he 
was living in and the treatment he suffered during his detention after ratification, account 
being taken of the State he was in after spending several years in those conditions before 
ratification…”. 
248 Wouters 2009, p. 535. 
249 First time in Ireland v United Kingdom, paragraph 167, where reference was made to 
Resolution 3452 (XXX) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 
December 1975. Afterwards CAT has been explicitly referred to in such cases as Selmouni v 
France, paragraph 97 and Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, paragraph 117. 
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on the issue of whether methods of handcuffing, hooding, shaking and sleep 
deprivation, either alone or in combination, amount to torture or not. ECtHR 
viewed that it amounted only to inhuman treatment250 while ComAT considered 
those methods to be in violation of article 1 of CAT251. This can be seen as 
somewhat surprising as one would assume that ECHR provides an individual 
wider protection from torture than CAT since the latter limits the scope in its 
definition of torture. I would argue that this single divergence of opinion should 
not be seen as reflecting the relationship between ECHR and CAT on the issue 
of torture as a whole, especially since the case where ECtHR expressed its view 
is relatively old. The main conclusion still remains: for a conduct to be viewed 
as torture in light of CAT the elements of intent, purpose and State involvement 
must be more rigorously satisfied than in the context of ECHR. 
 
Unlike CAT and ECHR, the Refugee Convention protects an individual from 
persecution when that individual has a well-founded fear of it. As discussed 
previously in chapter 2.2.2.3, persecution can be seen as a human rights 
violation which is attributed to the State’s activity or inactivity and results in 
serious harm to the protected individual. It must be connected to a 
discriminatory reason enlisted in the Refugee Convention, although the reasons 
are interpreted broadly and they do not need to be the sole cause for 
persecution. It becomes evident from this definition of persecution that it differs 
significantly from both torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. Persecution includes torture and other inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment but other human rights violations can amount to it as 
well, for instance violations of freedom of thought, conscience and religion or 
violations of socio-economic rights.252 It is important to note that when 
assessing persecution severity is determined “in light of all the 
                                                 
250 Ireland v United Kingdom, paragraph 167. 
251 ComAT 1998, paragraph 239 – 242. 
252 Wouters 2009, p. 538 – 539. 
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circumstances”253 instead of the seriousness of individual measures which can 
be seen as characteristic of ill-treatment proscribed by ECHR and CAT. It has 
been argued that this difference of emphasis on the situation as a whole leads to 
the conclusion that for instance when an individual is arbitrarily deprived of his 
nationality for a discriminatory reason and is left stateless that result amounts to 
persecution proscribed by the Refugee Convention but not to ill-treatment 
proscribed by CAT or ECHR254. Lastly, persecution differs from both torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the sense that it always 
requires a discriminatory element for a violation to amount to it255. For 
instance, being subjected to the death row phenomenon in USA has amounted 
to a breach of ECHR256 and being subjected to to preventive detention in Syria 
was a violation of CAT257  but neither of them would not, on their own, amount 
to persecution proscribed by the Refugee Convention. Thus, persecution would 
seem to protect a more diverse set of human rights, require a different minimum 
level of severity and require an additional element of discrimination in 
comparison to the ill-treatment proscribed by ECHR and CAT. 
 
How is the source of the harm assessed differently between ECHR, CAT and 
the Refuge Convention? In the context of CAT, the source is clearly most 
relevant since torture, by definition, requires at least some kind of involvement 
from public officials. The lowest level of involvement is acquiescence which 
can be described as a situation where a State knew or should have known about 
the risk of torture yet still failed to act accordingly. This differs most 
                                                 
253 UNHCR Handbook 2011, paragraph 55. 
254 Wouters 2009, p. 539 – 540. It is, however, at the same time mentioned that theoretically the 
aforementioned result could amount to degrading treatment proscribed by article 3 of 
ECHR. 
255 As mentioned in chapter 2.2.2.3, it has been proposed that torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment should be included in the definition of persecution 
regardless of whether these acts fulfill the discrimination requirement. See Lauterpacht and 
Bethlehem 2003, p. 123 – 127. This kind of interpretation would naturally limit the 
differences of the harm between the Refugee Convention and ECHR or CAT. 
256 Soering v. United Kingdom, paragraph 111. 
257 Chahin v. Sweden CAT/C/46/D/310/2007, UN Committee Against Torture, 2011, paragraph 
9.7. 
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significantly from the Refugee Convention which is silent regarding the source 
of the persecution. As earlier concluded in chapter 2.2.2.3, this silence leads to 
the conclusion that a human rights violation in which the victim suffers serious 
discriminatory harm amounts to persecution regardless of how, why and who 
instigated the violation. It is more difficult to assess how significant the 
difference is between ECHR and CAT since in the case law of ECtHR it has 
been stated that “…the risk of ill-treatment in the receiving country emanates 
from intentionally inflicted acts of the public authorities there or from non-State 
bodies when the authorities are unable to afford the applicant appropriate 
protection.”258. However, it would seem that the aforementioned statement, 
while a strong principal rule, does not limit the scope of protection if there exist 
sufficient exceptional conditions. For instance, if a terminally ill person who 
needed medical and social care could not receive it in his country of origin, then 
sending that person there would amount to ill-treatment proscribed by ECHR, 
even when “…the risk of being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment 
stemmed from factors for which the authorities in that country could not be held 
responsible…”259. In conclusion, regarding the source of the harm CAT is the 
most restrictive, the Refugee Convention the least restrictive and ECHR 
somewhere in between those two. 
 
3.4 Element of risk 
The element of risk can be considered the most important assessment regarding 
the prohibition on refoulement in all three of the human right treaties discussed 
here. The Refugee Convention requires a well-founded fear of persecution that 
can be established to a reasonable degree while in the context of ECHR the risk 
of proscribed ill-treatment must be real, personal and foreseeable. In the context 
of CAT there must be substantial grounds for believing in a danger of torture 
and, like ECHR, the danger must be real, personal and foreseeable. It is clear 
                                                 
258 N. v. United Kingdom 26565/05, European Court of Human Rights, 2008, paragraph 31. 
259 D v. United Kingdom, paragraphs 45, 53. 
  
67 
 
that, regardless of the treaty, the risk does not have to be certain or very 
probable and its assessment does not include any kind of exact probability 
calculus. It has been argued that there does not exist a difference in the material 
risk criterion between the Refugee Convention, ECHR and CAT260, and case 
law of ECtHR has been indicated as highlighting this lack of difference since 
that Court has referred in its risk assessment to the Refugee Convention 
criteria261. Since the formulation of risk seems to be terminologically identical 
between ECHR and CAT one could argue that if the risk assessment regarding 
ECHR and the Refugee Convention is identical then it can be presumed that the 
risk assessment regarding the Refugee Convention and CAT is identical as well. 
Although it has been stated that the risk assessment in the context of ECHR 
“…appears more elaborate…” than that of the two other treaty regimes, its 
material difference is still unclear262.  It is necessary next to compare the risk 
assessment in parts by first concentrating on what factors define, expand or 
limit it (past experiences, objectivity, individualization and group membership), 
then on the standard and burden of proof and finally on national protection 
alternatives including diplomatic assurances. 
 
It would seem that the relevance of past experiences of serious harm to the risk 
assessment differs between the treaties. ECHR seems to place the least 
emphasis on the past experiences of an applicant since in its case law ECtHR 
has rejected a refoulement claim despite the applicant suffering from a serious 
post-traumatic stress disorder related to his experiences in his country of 
origin263. The Refugee Convention would appear to give a little more relevance 
                                                 
260 Wouters 2009, p. 542. 
261 Ahmed v. Austria 71/1995/577/663, European Court of Human Rights, 1996, paragraphs 42-
44 and 47. It is evident that the Court concluded that there was a serious risk of proscribed 
ill-treatment because there still existed a well-founded fear of persecution for the applicant 
who had been previously granted a refugee status “within the meaning of the Geneva 
Convention”. See also Jabari v. Turkey 40035/98, European Court of Human Rights, 2000, 
paragraph 34 and 41-42. Again, the previous positive decision of a refugee status made by 
UNHCR was the primary motivation behind the Court’s decision that there existed a real 
risk of proscribed ill-treatment. This case will later be referred to as “Jabari v. Turkey”. 
262 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003, p. 161. 
263 Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, paragraphs 84-86. 
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to past experiences, since the risk can be assumed to be established sufficiently 
if the applicant has suffered persecution in the past, even if it is a refutable 
assumption264. Clearly the most emphasis on past experiences is placed by CAT 
since in its case law ComAT has accepted a refoulement claim based largely on 
the post-traumatic disorder suffered by the applicant265. In all three treaties, the 
risk must be assessed on the basis of objective facts and circumstances, not on a 
subjective emotion of an applicant. Both individual related and general human 
rights situation related issues are relevant in the risk assessment.  
 
The question of individualization and group membership is answered 
differently in ECHR, the Refugee Convention and CAT. In the context of 
ECHR both belonging to a group and individual reasons can either alone or 
cumulatively establish the risk of ill-treatment. Even the general violent 
conditions in a country alone may be sufficient to establish this risk. The 
Refugee Convention may also grant protection against refoulement on the basis 
of both group and individual factors but it cannot, however, establish a 
sufficient risk on the basis of general violent conditions in the country alone, 
unless there exist discriminatory reasons for those conditions. CAT is similar to 
the Refugee Convention as it too cannot grant protection against refoulement 
solely on the basis of general violent conditions, as the definition of torture 
requires intent and purpose from the perpetrator.  Although it can establish a 
sufficient risk based on both group and individual factors, the threshold for a 
group risk assessment would appear to be higher than in ECHR and the 
Refugee Convention. Thus, EHCR is the least strict treaty regarding 
individualization, while the Refugee Convention and CAT are more limited in 
their protection in this regard. It would seem that this difference stems from the 
fact that persecution requires discriminatory reasons behind the ill-treatment 
and there needs to exist purpose and intent from the perpetrator for an act to 
qualify as torture. Thus, they cannot include situations of general violence 
                                                 
264 UNHCR Handbook 2011, paragraph 45. Grahl-Madsen 1966, p. 176. 
265 El Rgeig v. Switzerland, paragraphs 7.4 and 8. 
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alone. Establishing a risk solely based on a group membership seems to have 
the same threshold between ECHR and the Refugee Convention, but comparing 
case law between ECtHR and ComAT indicates a higher threshold for this in 
the context of CAT266. 
 
Questions regarding proof of the risk of refoulement include issues of 
credibility, evidence and the burden of proof. It has been argued that credibility 
of a claim depends on three factors: internal credibility, plausibility and 
supporting evidence267. It seems that the three treaty regimes are quite identical 
in their requirements regarding credibility. For instance, the Refugee 
Convention, ECHR and CAT can all grant protection from refoulement despite 
minor discrepancies on internal credibility of the claim and lack of evidence. 
This would seem logical and justified in refoulement cases since often the 
circumstances of the applicants’ departures of their countries of origin have 
been very chaotic and stressful. Perhaps most lenient is CAT since torture 
victims have experienced even worse circumstances than those that are victims 
of proscribed ill-treatment or persecution generally have. On the evidentiary 
side, it would seem that the Refugee Convention is the most silent on its 
guidelines regarding this. CAT too does not have clear guidelines, but since it 
focuses largely on the past experiences of torture and their aftermath medical 
reports are viewed with particular interest in ComAT268. ECtHR, instead, has 
stated that the reliability of evidence is dependent on how objective and 
independent the source is and what kind of authority and reputation it has269. In 
                                                 
266 For instance, ComAT seems to emphasize the importance of individual factors despite the 
situation of the whole group in the case Sadiq Shek Elmi v. 
Australia CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, UN Committee Against Torture, 1999, paragraphs 6.7–
6.9. On a similar case ECtHR, instead, decided that there was a risk of ill-treatment on the 
basis of group membership alone, since “…it cannot be required of the  
      applicant that he establishes that further special distinguishing features, concerning him 
personally, exist…”, Salah Sheekh v. Netherlands, paragraph 148.  
267 Wouters 2009, p. 549. 
268 For instance, El Rgeig v. Switzerland, paragraphs 7.4 and 8. It would seem that the medical 
certificate regarding post-traumatic stress disorder was decisive for the conclusion that the 
applicant was granted protection from refoulement. 
269 For instance, Saadi v. Italy, paragraph 143. 
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general, ECtHR has also highlighted the evidential value of human rights 
information gathered by States’ diplomatic missions and the agencies of the 
United Nations270.  
 
In all three treaties, the burden of the proof lies primarily on the individual 
making a claim for protection. However, the determination of the risk of 
refoulement can be seen as a co-operative effort since the State too has to both 
assess and gather information itself and provide the individual with adequate 
possibilities to do this. Perhaps this co-operative responsibility is declared most 
clearly by ECtHR since it has demanded “rigorous scrutiny” of an individual’s 
claim271 and reliance on multiple sources to obtain a complete and accurate 
picture of the conditions272. Moreover, it has been argued that the basic 
assumption should be that the individual needs protection since the refugee 
definition has a declaratory character which implies this assumption273. Indeed, 
I agree that this should be the initial view that one takes in refoulement cases 
regardless of whether the claim for protection is based on the Refugee 
Convention, ECHR or CAT. 
 
The Refugee Convention has the clearest formulation of the national protection 
alternative as its article 1 (A) (2) requires that a person must be “unable or, 
owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”. 
Although article 3 of ECHR does not include this kind of a “protection clause”, 
ECtHR has assessed in its case law whether the country of origin is “…able to 
obviate the risk by providing appropriate protection.”274. There would appear to 
be at least some kind of a difference between the Refugee Convention and 
ECHR on this matter since ECtHR has only focused on the State’s ability and 
                                                 
270 For instance, NA. v. United Kingdom, paragraph 121. 
271 For instance, Jabari v. Turkey, paragraph 39. 
272 For instance, Said v. Netherlands, paragraph 54. 
273 Wouters 2009, p. 551. 
274 H.L.R. v France, paragraph 40. See also, for instance, Chahal v. United Kingdom, paragraph 
105. 
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willingness to provide protection whereas the Refugee Convention takes also 
into account the objective unwillingness of the individual. Thus it has been 
argued that, for instance, when a person has been traumatized by his 
experiences in his country of origin and is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country the outcome is different between these two treaties. In 
the context of the Refugee Convention the national protection alternative is 
considered not available while in the context of ECHR it may be considered 
available.275  In the context of CAT, it is more difficult to find clear guidelines 
what is required from the national protection alternative. However, ComAT has 
concluded that even military forces of a foreign State occupying an area of 
another country can provide protection to the individual which alleviates the 
risk of refoulement sufficiently276. Since CAT protects a person from ill-
treatment that must be connected in some way to State officials, it is reasonable 
that it rarely accepts internal protection as alleviating the risk of refoulement. 
The Refugee Convention too has a restrictive view on internal protection 
alternative but for different reasons than CAT since it has been argued that it 
accepts only States or formal State substitutes as providers of protection277. 
ECHR differs in this respect since ECtHR has in its case law accepted the 
possibility of protection provided by non-State actors too, even including 
international organizations278. 
 
Finally, all three of the human rights treaty regimes discussed here accept rather 
reluctantly the use of diplomatic assurances in alleviating the risk of 
refoulement. The most reluctant would appear to be the Refuge Convention, 
since in its context the individual has a fear of persecution and he is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of his country of origin. Thus the possibility of 
the country of origin to afford protection is already stroked out in the definition 
                                                 
275 Wouters 2009, p. 554 – 555. 
276 ComAT 2006, paragraph 20. 
277 Wouters 2009, p. 557. 
278 Thampibillai v. Netherlands, paragraph 67; Salah Sheekh v. Netherlands, paragraph 144; 
Muratovic v. Denmark (admissibility decision) 14513/03, European Court of Human Rights, 
2004. 
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of the prohibition of refoulement. As explained earlier in chapter 2.2.2.4, in the 
context of the Refugee Convention diplomatic assurances should be relevant 
only in the situation where the exception clause (article 33 (2)) is applied. CAT 
is not quite as reluctant as the Refugee Convention since the use of diplomatic 
assurances have been accepted in the case law of ComAT. However, this should 
be only when the assuring State is not systematically violating CAT’s 
provisions and only when there exist clear procedures for obtaining such 
assurances as well as arrangements for effective post-return monitoring. It 
would appear that ECHR may be the least reluctant to accept diplomatic 
assurances, if only because it has not formulated clear criteria regarding it. It 
has been argued that it is most troubling that ECtHR has not mentioned 
anything about post-return monitoring and judicial review mechanisms279. In all 
of the treaty regimes it would seem that diplomatic assurances are more viable 
in extradition cases while in non-extradition cases they are, at best, of limited 
use. 
 
3.5 The character of the principle of non-refoulement 
The character of the principle of non-refoulement refers here to whether the 
prohibition on refoulement is formulated in absolute terms or not. It has become 
clear that in the context of ECHR and CAT, there is no room for any exceptions 
regarding the prohibition on refoulement. It is explicitly stated in the text of 
these two treaties that no derogations can be made regarding the principle of 
refoulement even in exceptional conditions, such as wars or public 
emergencies.  Even serious criminal conduct cannot deprive an individual from 
the protection of refoulement. Although the absolute nature of the prohibition 
on refoulement has been and most likely continues be challenged over and over 
by States, both ECtHR and ComAT have persistently and consistently defended 
it. The Refugee Convention differs greatly from the two other treaties in this 
respect since exceptions to the prohibition on refoulement are codified into its 
                                                 
279 Wouters 2009, p. 560. 
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text explicitly. Thus it is not an absolute principle in the context of the Refugee 
Convention. It must be reminded here that neither the risk of ill-treatment nor 
other rights guaranteed to a refugee do not cease to exist despite the activation 
of the exception clause in the Refugee Convention. This situation can in many 
States lead to the conclusion that although the refugee could be deported back 
to his country of origin on the basis of the Refugee Convention, in reality it 
cannot be accomplished because other human rights treaties such as ECHR and 
CAT do not allow it. Indeed, it would seem that the difference in the character 
of the principle in many cases does not ultimately lead to a different outcome. 
However, it can still be seen as the clearest difference between these three 
human rights treaties and is important to keep in mind when comparing them. 
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4. Conclusion 
It would seem that one can deduce a general meaning of the principle of non-
refoulement in international law by looking at what its varying forms in 
different human right treaties have in common.  Regardless of whether we are 
discussing the Refugee Convention, ECHR or CAT, the prohibition on 
refoulement has essentially the same objective: to protect an individual from a 
risk to ill-treatment caused by rejection or deportation to a State by another 
State. Furthermore, that ill-treatment needs to achieve a certain level of severity 
as it is required to amount to some kind of a serious violation on the human 
rights of the individual protected. While the ill-treatment needs to achieve a 
certain level of severity, the risk does not have to be certain or very probable 
and its assessment does not include any kind of exact probability calculus, 
regardless of the treaty.   The principle of non-refoulement can be seen as an 
indirect way for protection since it aims to eliminate the decision that would 
occur before the individual faces a risk of ill-treatment: the decision of a State 
to deport a refugee back to an area where there clearly exists a risk of ill-
treatment. 
 
A research question which this thesis aims to answer is what content does the 
principle of non-refoulement have in international law under three human rights 
treaty regimes: the Refugee Convention, ECHR and CAT and what differences 
and similarities do the regimes have when compared against each other in this 
context?  To summarize, it has become clear that the main difference lies 
between the Refugee Convention and the latter two treaties. This results from 
several factors, the first being that the Refugee Convention, as its name implies, 
is aimed at protecting only refugees, whereas ECHR and CAT do not limit the 
scope of the protected individual. Secondly the Refugee Convention requires a 
discriminatory reason for the ill-treatment while ECHR and CAT, although 
different on the precise content and source of the harm, do not. Thirdly, the 
nature of the principle is not absolute in the context of the Refugee Convention 
since it includes exceptions while in the context of the latter two treaties no 
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derogations to the principle can be made in any conditions.  Lastly, the Refugee 
Convention has not, at least up until now, proven to be capable of efficiently 
monitoring and enforcing the principle of non-refoulement through supervisory 
mechanisms. On the contrary, ECtHR and ComAT have both accumulated a 
vast amount of case law which both clarifies the content of the principle as well 
as emphasizes its importance on States aiming to circumvent it. Especially 
ECHR and its supervisory mechanism, ECtHR, can be seen as the most 
efficient and widely used regime in the prohibition of refoulement. However, it 
cannot be concluded that the protection afforded by ECHR is always superior 
compared to the other two treaty regimes280. Rather it should be concluded that 
depending on the particular details of the case these three treaty regimes often 
differ on the outcome of whether protection should be granted or not. Still, most 
often the difference lies between the Refugee Convention on the one hand and 
ECHR and CAT on the other281. 
 
The second research question concerned gaps of refugee protection regarding a 
treaty regime and the possibility of filling those gaps with the protection 
granted by another treaty regime. I have discussed gaps in protection separately 
in chapters concerning different treaty regimes but now it is necessary to 
evaluate the relationship between these gaps and the three treaty regimes 
analyzed in this thesis. First, the Refugee Convention had three significant 
protection gaps: territorial restriction to outside of country of origin, 
discriminatory requirement to the harm from which a person is protected from 
and exceptions to the prohibition on refoulement based on the danger that the 
refugee poses to the refugee State. Both the ECHR and CAT are capable of 
filling all three of these gaps, with the reservation that ECHR limits its 
Contracting States regionally and CAT requires the non-discriminate harm to 
amount to torture as defined by its own articles. Secondly, ECHR is, as 
                                                 
280 Although case law of ECtHR points out that the protection granted by ECHR is ”wider” than 
that of the Refugee Convention, see Chahal v. United Kingdom, paragraph 80. 
281 For instance, Pirjola argues that ECHR and CAT seem to offer stronger protection against 
refoulement than the Refugee Convention, see Pirjola 2002, p. 756. 
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mentioned before, a regional treaty and thus its scope is limited mainly to 
Europe. This kind of protection gap is filled by both the Refugee Convention 
and CAT since they are universal human rights treaties established under the 
United Nations. Lastly, a protection gap regarding CAT is that it requires the 
harm from which a person is protected from to amount to torture as defined by 
its own articles. Since ECHR protects not only from torture but also from 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment it naturally can fill the 
protection gap regarding CAT. The gap can be filled by the Refugee Convention 
as well, since it protects from persecution which can be described as a human 
rights violation that is attributed to the State’s activity or inactivity and results 
in serious harm to the protected individual. Because the Refugee Convention 
can fill this particular protection gap only when there is a discriminatory reason 
connected to the harm, it can be concluded that ECHR would seem to offer the 
most efficient protection in this sense. 
  
Finally, it is important to remember that the essential content of this principle of 
non-refoulement, which is the same regardless of the treaty, should not be taken 
for granted as States have time after time presented opposition and resistance to 
adhering to it completely. Although the treaty regimes have proven out to be 
rather resilient in defending the principle, there seems to be no indications that 
States would now cease to try and circumvent or oppose it. Quite to the 
contrary, the growing refugee issue for instance as highlighted by the mass of 
people moving from Syria to all over Europe presents serious threats to 
upholding the essential notion of protecting individuals from serious violations 
to their human rights. Thus, fighting for the survival of the prohibition on 
refoulement is crucial in today’s field of refugee law, and more broadly, in 
international human rights law as well. 
 
  
